Short- and long-run effects of early grades by FACCHINELLO, Luca
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Economics School of Economics
4-2017
The impact of early grading on academic choices:
Mechanisms and social implications
Luca FACCHINELLO
Singapore Management University, lfacchinello@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2966571
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all
Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, and the Education
Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
FACCHINELLO, Luca. The impact of early grading on academic choices: Mechanisms and social implications. (2017). 1-118.
Research Collection School of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/6
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966571 
The Impact of Early Grading on Academic Choices:
Mechanisms and Social Implications
Luca Facchinello?
April 26, 2017
Abstract
Does early grading affect educational choices? To answer the question, I exploit the stag-
gered implementation of a reform which postponed grade assignment in Swedish compulsory
school. I identify short- and long-term effects of early grading, for students with different
academic ability and socioeconomic status (SES). When graded early on, high-ability stu-
dents (especially if high-SES) perform better, and are more likely to choose academic courses
during compulsory school. Low-ability students react in the opposite way, in particular if
low-SES. While high school attainment increases for high-ability low-SES students, college
attainment decreases for low-ability low-SES students. None of these effects carry over to
the labor market. This suggests that early grades improve the match between early edu-
cation choices and academic ability, reduce over-investment in education, but exacerbate
educational inequality. I find no evidence of demotivating effects for low-ability students,
a plausible mechanism through which grades could affect education choices, and the main
motivation behind the grading reform. Theoretically, I show that short-term effects are in
line with the predictions of a model where students learn about their ability from SES and
grades.
JEL codes: I21; I28; J24
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1 Introduction
Recent models of education choice (e.g., Altonji, 1993) have highlighted the role that
uncertainty about own ability and preferences plays in educational choice. Academic
ability positively affects final grades and the probability to complete any chosen education
path. When students are uncertain about own ability, any relevant information might
affect expected returns to education, and thus education choices.
In this paper I investigate how assigning grades in early compulsory school affects
educational choices and attainment of Swedish students. To investigate mechanisms I
compare the empirical results to the predictions of a sequential choice learning model
calibrated to the data.
The institutional setup and the data are particularly suitable to answer the research
question. In Sweden, students used to receive the first formal grades in school year
3, at age 10. Differently from the test scores received during the year, these grades
were standardized, and hence provided students with a clear benchmark to assess own
ability. In 1969 a curriculum reform allowed municipalities to postpone grade assignment
to school years 6 or 7. In 1982, a second reform compelled all municipalities to postpone
grade assignment to school year 8. The two reforms, gradually implemented over time in
different municipalities, provide a source of exogenous variation in grade assignment.
I use nationally representative survey data, matched with register data, on two co-
horts. The 1967 cohort , not affected by the final reform, comprises students in “treatment
municipalities”, where formal grades were assigned in school years 3 and from school year
6 onwards, and students in “control municipalities”. Half of the latter started receiving
formal grades only from school year 7. The rest was graded in school year 3, but not in
school year 6. Students born in 1972 started instead receiving grades in school year 8 in
both treatment and control municipalities.
If the education choices of students in treatment and control municipalities trend in
the same way over time, it is possible to isolate the effect of early grade assignment from
pre-existing differences between the two sets of municipalities. I provide evidence that
trends in educational attainment are the same in treatment and control municipalities,
for cohorts who did not receive early grades. I also show that pre-treatment differences
in determinants of education appear in general to persist over time.
To guide the empirical analysis, I set up a model of early education choice mirroring
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the most important features of the institutional setup.1 Ability determines optimal ef-
fort and education choices: for low-ability students it is optimal to exert low effort and
enroll into vocational high school. For high-ability students higher effort and academic
education are instead optimal. Students are uncertain about their academic ability, but
observe their SES: high-SES children are on average endowed with higher ability than
low-SES children. Grades reveal information about own ability, and allow students to
re-optimize their choices. As in the institutional setup, students never observe grades
in early compulsory school, but can be observe grading information starting from either
middle or late compulsory school.
The calibrated model shows that early grade assignment results in better sorting of
students into education, that is, in choices closer to first best. However, students with the
same ability react differently to grades, due to different priors about ability. Low (high)
SES students who observe low (high) ability signals confirm their priors, and thus react
more strongly to the information. Students who receive signals inconsistent with their
priors, have a weaker response to the additional information. The model solution implies
different responses to early grading for very low ability students, low ability students, and
high ability students. With early grades, students with very low ability increase effort in
compulsory school, are more likely to choose vocational high school, and are thus less likely
to drop out of high school. Low-ability students on average reduce effort in compulsory
school, and are more likely to choose vocational education paths. These responses appear
to be stronger for low-SES students, who are more sensitive to low ability signals. When
graded early on, high-ability students increase effort in late compulsory school if they are
low-SES, and decrease it if they are high-SES. All high-ability students are more likely to
choose academic high school, but only low-SES students exhibit higher college attainment
as a result of early grading: some high-ability high-SES students fail to access college due
to early reductions in effort.
The model guides the empirical analysis: I present the effects of early grades for
students with different SES and academic ability. SES is proxied by parental education,
academic ability by ability tests administered in school year 6.2
To assess the effect of early grades on short-term effort, I focus on two outcomes,
grades and academic course choices in late compulsory school. Higher grades require
higher effort, while academic courses are more demanding. Results are broadly consistent
with model’s predictions: when graded early on, low-ability students, especially if low-
SES, receive lower grades and are less likely to choose academic courses in late compulsory
1The model builds on the theoretical framework outlined in Altonji et al (2012)
2I renormalize ability at the cohort-treatment level to avoid endogeneity issues.
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school. High-ability students exhibit higher grades in late compulsory school, but do not
revise course choices. The pattern found in the model is thus reproduced by the data,
with the difference that high-ability high-SES students are putting more effort, instead of
reducing it.3
I consider thereafter the effect of early grades on high school choices and attainment. I
find an increase in high school enrollment for all students.4 Contrary to model predictions,
I do not observe changes in high school track choice. I propose as an explanation that
preferences for education might attenuate the effects of early grades.5 I find effects on
educational attainment only for low-SES students. Early grading leads to a 3 percentage
points decrease in college attainment for low-ability low-SES students, and a 6 percentage
points increase in high school attainment for high-ability low-SES students, mostly due
to a reduction in dropout.
Do the effects found on education carry over to the labor market? I find that early
grades do not affect income at ages 33-40. They however lead to an increase in upward
income mobility for low-ability low-SES students, who showed the strongest reductions
in academic performance and educational attainment. This suggests that early grades
improved the match between education choices and academic ability, and reduced over-
investment in education. Methodologically I confirm the importance of evaluating educa-
tion policy in the long-run: limiting the analysis to short-term or intermediate education
outcomes would have led to different conclusions.
The idea that early grades could motivate/demotivate children in compulsory school
was the main motivation behind the grading reform. To investigate this mechanism, I test
for the effect of early grades on student motivation and attitudes toward school. These
outcomes are measured from survey responses in school year 6 and in late compulsory
school. I find no evidence of early grading discouraging or motivating students, which
reinforces the main idea of grades affecting student choices via information.
I conclude that, on the one hand, early grades allow students to better sort into
education, thus increasing efficiency. On the other hand, they lead to an increase in
inequality in educational attainment, and to reductions in effort in compulsory school for
3The result can be easily reconciled with the model assuming that college majors with higher expected
returns to education require more academic preparation, and thus higher effort in school early on.
4This is due to the increase in effort during compulsory school for high-ability students. While low-
ability students reduced effort, the weakest students could have increased effort when graded early on, as
predicted by the model.
5My data shows that, controlling for ability, high-SES students’ academic high school enrollment rates are
20 percentage points higher than those of low-SES students. At the same time grade differences in late
compulsory school between high- and low-SES students are at most one fourth of a grade: SES appears
to strongly affect high school choices in Sweden, independently of ability.
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low-ability students. The final judgement on the policy depends thus on the objectives of
the policy-maker.
Early grading has relevant effects in the Swedish education system, in which students
are explicitly sorted into academic tracks that provide access to college (a tracked educa-
tion system). To what extent do my results generalize to different setups? As knowledge
production is cumulative, early education choices constrain late choices for all students
(e.g., college preparation affects college enrollment). Assigning grades early on might thus
affect students’ education choices and attainment also in non-tracked (comprehensive) ed-
ucation systems.6
The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how grading information affect
students at early stages of education, when children have less information on their aca-
demic ability, and are still unconstrained by their previous choices. The role of grades on
education choice has been studied in the economic literature mostly at the college level.
My results are consistent with the learning mechanism outlined by Stinebrickner & Stine-
brickner (2012) and Zafar (2011), who find that college students who get lower (higher)
than expected grades are more (less) likely to drop out or switch to an easier major. In
relation to the college grading literature, this paper improves on three dimensions. First,
at the college level, it is not clear whether students are learning from grades about aca-
demic ability or previous preparation. This is less of a concern in my setup, since grades
start being assigned when children are 10. The detailed empirical analysis also appears to
support information as the main channel through which grades affect education choices.
Second, my analysis shows that responses to early grading information strongly differ by
SES, a dimension which was missing in the previous two studies due to the institutional
setups considered.7 Finally, my analysis also focuses on the long-run effects of grading,
and shows that inferring labor market outcomes from short-run educational outcomes
might be problematic.
My paper is also related to the grading standards literature, which stresses the role of
ability in students’ responses to grades. Becker & Rosen (1992) and Betts (1998) show
theoretically that higher grading standards encourage high ability students to put more
effort, while students below standard might be discouraged. Betts & Grogger (2003)
empirically confirm the heterogeneous effects of increasing grading standards at the high
school level, while Figlio & Lucas (2004) find that higher standards lead to positive results
6Early grade assignment has a bigger impact in tracked education systems because students face early
choices, and benefit to a greater extent of timely information about ability. This point has not received
much attention in the tracking literature (e.g., Brunello & Checchi, 2007).
7Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2012) consider a college targeted at disadvantaged students, while Zafar
(2011) surveyed undergraduates enrolled at Northwestern University.
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on test scores, with effects that depend on the ability of the student relative to the class.
In my setup, adding formal grades to test scores could be construed as an increase in
grading standards. While my results appear to be consistent with Betts (1998), I rule
out motivation as the channel through which releasing additional grades affect students
choices, and instead find evidence consistent with an information story.
The grading reform I consider has been previously studied by Alli Klapp (2014, 2015)
in the educational psychology literature8 and by Sjögren (2010) in economics. Sjögren’s
working paper uses administrative data on twenty cohorts of students to identify the
reduced-sform effect of the reform on final education and income. She finds evidence of
a positive effect of early grading on educational attainment for girls. Contrary to my
results, she finds a negative effect on higher education for high-SES students. While the
identification strategy is basically the same, she controls for pre-trends to account for
differences in educational attainment found before and after the reform took place. In
my paper, a battery of refutability tests shows identification to be more robust. The
difference in robustness is likely due to the different cohorts and municipalities used in
the analysis. Sjögren needs to assume parallel trends over two decades, a period of time
in which the probability that the the two sets of municipalities undergo different shocks,
biasing estimates, is higher. I use a sharper design: I consider two nearby cohorts who
were studying before and after the second reform took place. I only need to assume
parallel trends within a 5-year period, at the cost of losing some precision in my estimates.
Apart from identification, my paper complements Sjögren (2010) in three ways. First,
I study both long- and short-run effects of early grades, which is possible due to the
use of rich survey data. Second, I focus on the mechanisms through which grades affect
education choice, and show theoretically that the effect of early grades might substantially
differ along the ability and SES dimensions. Third, I test empirically the predictions of
my learning model, and confirm a nuanced pattern broadly consistent with the learning
mechanism posited in my model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I describe the data, the education system,
and the grading reforms. In Section 3 I set up the sequential choice learning model that
guides the empirical analysis, and illustrate the solution to the model. Section 4 discusses
the model’s results. In Section 5 I turn to the empirical analysis, and discuss identification,
inference and robustness. Section 6 discusses empirical results, while Section 7 relates
them to the literature. Section 8 draws conclusions.
8Klapp’s papers are descriptive regression-control studies
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2 Institutional Setup
2.1 Data
I use survey data matched to administrative data. The surveys are part of Evaluation
Through Follow-up (ETF), a longitudinal project which surveys every 5 years represen-
tative samples of Swedish students enrolled in compulsory school. I use waves 3 and 4
of the study, corresponding to cohorts born approximately in 1967 and 1972.9 The 1967
cohort was followed from 1980, when students were in school year 6 (most students were
13 at the time). The 1972 cohort was followed from 1982, when students were in school
year 3 (most students were 10 at the time).
Each sample consists of roughly 9000 Swedish compulsory school students (10% of
the targeted population) living in 29 (out of 290) municipalities, the lowest administra-
tive division in Sweden. Whole classes were systematically sampled from municipalities,
and the same municipalities were extracted in both waves.10 The final sample is thus a
repeated cross-section, which allows me to implement a difference in differences identifi-
cation strategy.
The survey data contains relevant information for the analysis. First, sampled students
took standard intelligence tests in verbal, logical and spatial ability in school year 6,
before end-of-the-year grades were assigned. The tests are the same for both cohorts,
which grants comparability of the intelligence measures over time. At the time of the
tests students were 13, a point in which IQ should have already stabilized (Cunha &
Heckman, 2009). I can thus investigate the effects of early grading using proper measures
of ability, rather than previous performance measures. Second, grades and course choices
in compulsory school are recored from school registers. This allows me to inspect the
effect of early grading right after grades were assigned. Third, children filled in detailed
surveys in school years 6 and 10 (the first year of high school). They were asked questions
about own ability, course and high school track choices, well-being and motivation in
school. I use children responses about stress, anxiety, and motivation as outcomes to
understand whether early grades have motivating/demotivating effects on the children, a
main concern in the policy debate. Finally, parents were surveyed when children received
their first survey. They were asked questions about school choices and priorities. This
evidence helps to understand whether and to what extent choices of parents living in
9From now on, the 1967 and 1972 cohorts.
10Municipalities are drawn using stratified sampling. Strata are defined by population, fraction of left-wing
voters, fraction working in the public sector and fraction of immigrants. The three biggest municipalities in
Sweden (Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg) are always part of the sample. Further details on the sampling
scheme can be found in Emanuelsson (1979).
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early grading municipalities differ from those of parents living in municipalities where
early grades were abolished.11
I match to the sample high quality register data from Statistics Sweden. For both
cohorts I observe parental education, income and basic demographics. These variables
allow me to test for compositional change in the sample, and allow to increase precision
in the main specification. The registers record educational attainment and income at ages
33-40 for both cohorts. This allows me to evaluate how the short- and medium-run effects
of early grading transmit to the labor market.
2.2 The Education System
Table 1 summarizes the educational setup for the two cohorts in my sample.12 In Sweden
compulsory school (Grundskola) starts at age 7 and lasts 9 years. In the period I consider,
it was formally divided in three stages, that could also entail physically changing schools:
early compulsory school (grades 1-3), middle compulsory school (grades 4-6), and late
compulsory school (grades 7-9). Standardized end-of-the-year grades were released at the
end of each education cycle, and every year in late compulsory school. Early grades were
over time abolished. I devote the next section to grades and the grading reforms.
Table 1: Structure of Swedish education
Compulsory school Non Compulsory school
Early and
Middle Late
High
School College
Age 7-12 13-15 16-19
Selection:
- HS track
- GPA or
SweSAT
Funding:
- Free tuition and
grants
- Loans for living
expenses
School Year 1-6 7-9 10-12
Grades (3), (6) (7), 8, 9 10-12
Choices -
General or
advanced
courses
Vocational
or academic
track
Selection - -
GPA and
course
choices
The Swedish education system is characterized by early tracking. In the spring of
school year 6, children have to choose whether to take math and English at the advanced
11See Facchinello et al. (2016) for a more thorough description of the survey data.
12The education system is very similar to the current one.
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or general level in the next school year. Academic electives provide better preparation for
academic tracks in high school. Students are allowed to switch course type over time. At
the end of compulsory school, students can enroll in either academic or vocational high
school tracks. Vocational tracks provide professional training. In the period I consider,
these tracks lasted two years, and did not allow direct access to college. Academic high
school tracks, meant to prepare for college, last three or four years, and are selective.13
After three years of high school (students could take an additional year of high school
after vocational tracks) students become eligible to apply to college. A student quota, set
by the government, limits access to college. Slots are competitively assigned to the stu-
dents with highest GPA or SweSAT (a college entry test similar to the American SAT).14
College is tuition-free, and a mix of grants and income-contingent loans allows admitted
students to pay for living expenses. Higher education is thus both meritocratic and com-
petitive. Appendix B.2 presents detailed evidence on education choices and attainment
for the sampled cohorts.
2.3 Grades and the Reform
Standardized grades in math, English and Swedish are assigned at the end of specific school
years during compulsory school. In the period considered, grades were norm-referenced at
the national level: they represented student performance in relation to the whole student
cohort.15 Given that only homework and test scores are assigned during the school year,
these grades provided additional information about school performance. In particular,
they conveyed a first benchmark measure of students’ academic ability. Grades could give
a first idea of where the students stood in the national distribution, a relevant piece of
information given that admission to college was restricted by a binding quota system.
The school year in which grades were first assigned was over time postponed from
school year 3, when students were 10, to school year 8, when they were 15.16 Up to
1968, grades were assigned in school years 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9. In 1969 a curriculum reform
(Curriculum Lgr 69) allowed municipal school boards to abolish “early” grades, that is,
13Grade 9 GPA and advanced math in compulsory school can be used as admission requirements.
14Öckert (2002) reports that around 50% of the students were rejected admission to college in the period
I study, confirming the selective nature of Swedish higher education.
15Tests were corrected by the teachers. The government used the scores to determine the national grade
distribution. When assigning final grades, teachers could deviate from test scores, if they thought the
student test performance did not reflect proficiency.
16In 2012 grades were reintroduced in school year 6, and the government is considering assigning grades
also in school year 4.
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1969 1982
Final reform: no grades 
allowed in school  years 3 
and 6
1984
Early reform: possibility 
to abolish grades in 
school years 3 and 6
school year 6:
1979 1981
1976
school year 3:
Cohort
1967
Cohort
1972
Cohort
1972
Cohort
1967
Figure 1: Grading reform timeline and sampled cohorts
grades in school years 3 and 6. As a substitute for the abolished grades the reform intro-
duced parent-teacher conferences, non-compulsory biannual meetings in which teachers
evaluated students’ improvement over the year. Sjögren (2010) reports that supporters
of early grade abolition were concerned that early grades could harm low SES or poorly
performing students. The idea behind the grading reform was that of making the class
environment less competitive, and more inclusive.
Starting from 1969, more and more municipalities took the chance to abolish grades in
the early school years, but the issue was contentious. Left-wing parties (Social Democrats
and Communists) in general favored early grades abolition, while right-wing parties (Cen-
ter party and Moderate Party) leaned towards keeping the early grades (see Figure B.2 on
page 79). In the end the government, led by a socialist majority, chose to abolish “early
grading” in all municipalities: starting from 1982 (Curriculum Lgr 80), end-of-the-year
grades were released only from school year 8, when students are 15.
Figure 1 shows in a timeline how the reforms affected the two cohorts in the sample.
Half of the municipalities in the 1967 cohort sample were assigning grades in school year
6, while the rest had abolished them.17 While grade assignment in school year 3 is not
recorded in my data for this cohort (due to children being followed from school year
6), Sjögren and Zetterberg18 report that virtually all students (93%) in the treatment
17Figure B.3 shows in a map the municipalities assigning early grades.
18Unpublished manuscript, 2008.
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municipalities received grades in school year 3, while less than half (43%) of the students
in control municipalities were graded in school year 3. No municipality in the 1972 cohort
sample was assigning grades in school years 3 and 6. Finally, end-of-the-year grades were
assigned for all cohorts and municipalities in school years 8 and 9.19
Table 2: Grade assignment
1967
Cohort
1972
Cohort
Treatment
Municipalities




Year 3
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 8
Year 9
Control
Municipalities
(Year 3)
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 8
Year 9
Table 2 summarizes the grading/treatment structure. I label “treatment municipal-
ities” those municipalities that were assigning grades in school year 3 and 6 before the
final reform, “control municipalities” those not assigning grades in school year 6 before
the final reform. Treated students are those who received early grades in school years 3
and 6, which is true for students born in 1967 and studying in treatment municipalities.
In my analysis treatment can be interpreted as receiving standardized information
about own ability earlier than the control group. Most of the treated students indeed
got their first standardized grades at age 10. More than half of the control students
observed similar information only 4 years later, at age 14, after they had already chosen
math and English electives in school year 6 - their first education choice. The rest of the
control group received grades in school year 3, did not observe grades in school year 6,
but could have attended parent-teacher conferences. While it is not possible to pinpoint
treatment intensity at the individual level, it is clear that the treatment group was on
average exposed to standardized information about ability earlier than the control group.
19Differently from earlier school years, they were assigned two times per year, at the end of each semester.
Details are taken from Skolverket.
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3 Model
The model presented in this section investigates how early grading affects students’ educa-
tion choices and attainment when grades convey information about ability. The qualitative
predictions of the model are compared to empirical results in Section 6.
3.1 Structure of the Model
The model focuses on the link between early education choices, educational attainment,
and lifetime income. I model explicitly early phases of education, and treat non-compulsory
education and the labor market as realizations. The structure of the model is illustrated
in Figure 2.Compulsory education is divided, as in my setup, into three periods: early
compulsory school (t1), middle compulsory school (t2), and late compulsory school (t3).
Vocational high school
Medium wage High wage (with high ability)
No high school
Low wage
Middle compulsory school:
If grades are assigned, children update priors and, potentially, revise effort choices.
Late compulsory school:
Grades are assigned. Children update priors and, potentially, revise effort and high school choices.
Academic high school
College
Early compulsory school:
No grades are assigned. Children choose effort based on their family background (SES).
Figure 2: Structure of the model
In each period student i chooses how much effort to exert: eit ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Effort choices and
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academic ability (ai) determine the stock of knowledge (kit) the student accumulates:20
kit = ωt(αai + βeit) + δkit−1. (1)
After the end of compulsory education students have three choices. They can go to work
(E1) and earn low wages (w1). They can enroll into vocational high school (E2) and study
for two years, or enroll into academic high school (E3) and study for three years. Both
high school tracks grant medium wage (w2 = w3) upon graduation. Academic high school
is the only option that gives access to college (E4), which lasts four years and grants upon
graduation wages increasing with academic ability, w4 = f(ai).21
Completing higher levels of education and accessing academic high school requires
higher knowledge, and thus higher ability and effort, at the end of period 3. Notice that
knowledge is here not productive per se, as wages fully depend on attained education
and ability. This is consistent with a signaling model where employers are uncertain
about workers’ ability, but observe attained education (Spence, 1974). Higher education
is attained in equilibrium only by high-ability workers, who fetch higher wages in the
market. The knowledge thresholds at time 3 are the following:
k¯E2 < kE3 < k¯E3 < k¯E4 , (2)
where kEj and k¯Ej are respectively the entry and attainment requirements for education
level Ej . Failure to meet the thresholds results in dropout (assumed at the midpoint of
each education level), and thus in foregone earnings. Given that high school grants the
same wage independently of track, it is optimal to enter academic high school only under
the expectation to be able to complete college.22 Academic ability determines indeed
optimal education and effort choices. Low-ability students, ai ∈ {1, 2, 3}, optimally choose
vocational school, and exert levels of effort inversely proportional to their ability during
compulsory school: a weaker student needs to exert higher effort in school to reach the
same education level. The optimal education choice of high-ability students, ai ∈ {4, 5},
is academic high school, followed by college. To attain college education they need to
exert higher effort in compulsory school.
Students are uncertain about academic ability, a˜it ∼ ft(ai), but know their SES. Their
priors reflect the ability distribution of their SES group, f1(ai) = f(ai|SES), with low-SES
20The three stages of education have different lengths in my setup. Weights ωt adjust the length of each
stage to mimic the actual setup.
21As this is a stylized model, returns to education do not reflect the substantial wage heterogeneity docu-
mented in the literature (Arcidiacono, 2004; Hussey et al, 2011).
22I do not model entry to college, and simply consider people staying out as college dropouts.
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students having on average lower ability than high-SES students.23 Grades are unbiased
ability signals, thus allow students to update their priors about academic ability. They
can be assigned in middle compulsory school, and are always assigned in late compulsory
school, before students choose high school track:
gi2 = d(ai + 2) with 2 ∼ N
(
0, σ22()
)
, (3)
gi3 = d(ai + 3) with 3 ∼ N
(
0, σ23()
)
, (4)
where d is a function that maps the normal values into the discrete 1-5 ability scale.
Grades assigned in late compulsory school are more precise than grades assigned in middle
compulsory school: σ22() > σ23(). This reflects the fact that more grades are assigned in
the last period of compulsory school. Table 3 makes explicit the information structure in
Table 3: Information structure
Early grades Late grades
f1(ai) f(ai|SES) f(ai|SES)
f2(ai) f(ai|gi2, SES) f(ai|SES)
f3(ai) f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES) f(ai|gi3, SES)
the three periods. If early grades are not assigned in period 2, students’ beliefs remain
unchanged: f2(ai) = f(ai|SES). Otherwise they are updated: f2(ai) = f(ai|gi2, SES).
In period 3 grades are always assigned, so that f3(ai) = f(ai|gi3, SES) if no grades are
assigned in middle compulsory school, and f3(ai) = f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES) with early grades.
Finally, when students update their priors about ability in period τ , they revise their
beliefs about accumulated and future knowledge at any time t:
k˜it,τ =
5∑
j=1
Pτ (ai = j)×
[
ωt(αj + βeit) + δk˜it−1,τ
]
. (5)
3.2 Optimal Choice
Given their information about ability in period τ , students consider optimal effort and
education choices in any subsequent period t ≥ τ . They choose the education level that
23Régner (2002) discusses biases about ability for low SES students in the psychology literature.
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gives the highest utility, and the associated optimal effort level eE?it,τ :
e?it,τ = arg max
eEs?it,τ
{
V E1i (e
E1?
it ), V
E2
i,τ (e
E2?
it,τ ), V
E3
i,τ (e
E3?
it,τ )
}
. (6)
The value of compulsory school, V E1i , does not depend on ability, and is thus not indexed
by time. It is maximized when effort is set to the lowest level, so V 1?i = k. As vocational
and academic high school have access and attainment requirements, values V E2i,τ and V
E3
i,τ
depend on students’ beliefs about ability. They are indexed by the time index τ , as k˜i3,τ
changes when new information is revealed:
V E2i,τ =
∑3
t=τ C(e
E2?
it,τ ) + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2) (7)
+P (k˜i3,τ < k¯
E2)U((L− 1)× w1))
V E3i,τ =
∑3
t=τ C(e
E3?
it ) + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E4)× U((L− 7)× w3(ai)) + (8)
P (k¯E3 ≤ k˜i3,τ < k¯E4)× U((L− 5)× w2) + P (kE3 ≤ k˜i3,τ < k¯E3)× U((L− 2)× w1)
P (k˜i3,τ < k
E3)×
[
P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2 + P (k˜i3,τ < k¯E2)× U((L− 1)× w1)
]
.
C is a convex cost function, U is a concave utility function, and L is the number of working
years.
The effect of grades
When students are assigned grades they update their priors in the direction of their true
ability level. Figures A.5 to A.9 in Appendix A.2 show priors and posterior distributions
of ability after grades are assigned. Updating can have two effects: an “income” and
a “substitution” effect. When the student realizes she has higher (lower) ability than
expected, she revises the level of knowledge accumulated upward (downward). Provided
the optimal education choice has not changed, the student will need to put weakly less
(more) effort to reach the level of non-compulsory education she was targeting, an “income
effect”:
∂eEs?it
∂a˜it
∣∣∣∣∣
E?t =E
?
t−1
=
∂k˜ti3
∂a˜it
× ∂e
Es?
it
∂k˜ti3
≤ 0. (9)
If after observing the signal expected ability is high (low) enough to alter optimal ed-
ucational choice, the student will instead revise effort choices upward (downward), a
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“substitution effect”:24
∂eEs?it
∂a˜it
∣∣∣∣∣
E?t 6=E?t−1
=
∂k˜ti3
∂a˜it
× ∂e
Es?
it
∂k˜ti3
≥ 0. (10)
4 Model’s Results
Before discussing the model’s predictions, it is important to be clear about the purpose
of the model. The model is meant to qualitatively assess the effect of early grades in the
specific setup I consider. I calibrate to the data the key parameters of the model: ability
distributions and education payoffs. I set thresholds for educational attainment such that
higher levels of education require both higher ability and effort. Parameters with no direct
counterpart in the data (knowledge production function, precision of grade signals, and
value function parameters) are fixed to specific values.25 Appendix A.1 contains further
details on calibration, and provides evidence on model assumptions. I do not estimate the
model. While this might be an interesting direction for future research, my aim here is to
generate qualitative predictions of the effect of early grading in a learning model, rather
than fitting the data.
I solve numerically the model under three different information setups: late grade
assignment, early grade assignment and, as a benchmark, full information.26 In Table
4, I show as a reference optimal effort and education choices by ability level under full
information. The “income effect” is clear for both low- and high-ability students: for
Table 4: Optimal choices under full information
ai ei1 ei2 ei3 E V
E
i,1
Low-ability
1 Medium Medium Medium Vocational 106.53
2 Medium Medium Low Vocational 112.63
3 Low High Low Vocational 115.84
High-ability
4 High High Medium Academic 126.49
5 Medium High Medium Academic 155.48
higher levels of ability it is optimal to put less effort. The “substitution effect” appears
when ability changes from 3 to 4: students need to put higher effort early on in order to
be able to attain college education.
24Higher education levels always require higher knowledge, and thus higher effort early on.
25Results remain qualitatively the same when slightly changing the parameters. Extreme parameterizations
lead to different predictions, but are also inconsistent with the data observed.
26Appendix A.2 presents the simulation and solution methods.
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4.1 Effort in Compulsory School
Figure 3 shows optimal effort choices in t1, before grades are assigned. Given that addi-
tional information will arrive in t2, effort choices might change before grades are released.
This is not the case in my simulations. Under uncertainty about ability, it is always op-
timal for both low- and high-SES students to keep effort at a medium level. This is due
to three reasons. First, uncertainty favors higher effort early on: putting low effort in the
beginning might actually prevent the student from entering academic high school, and
thus college. Second, even if the student learns that she is high-ability in time, she would
then need to compensate for previous suboptimal effort levels: as effort costs are convex,
this behavior would not be optimal. Finally, knowledge production is cumulative, so it is
better to exert higher effort early on, when effort is more productive.
27.9 43.2 28.9
100.0
31.2 46.8 22.0
100.0
High-SES
Low-SES
Full Info
Uncertainty
Full Info
Uncertainty
Early Effort Choice by Information Regime and SES
Low Medium High
Figure 3: Early effort choice by SES and information regime
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in early compulsory school. Since in this period no
grades are assigned, choices are the same for both low and high ability students, and can only
differ by SES. Assigning early or late grades does not change effort choices in t1.
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In middle compulsory school treated students observe grades. Figure A.10 in Appendix
A.3 compares posterior distributions of ability for low and high SES students who get the
same grades in t2. While all students update priors in the right directions, updates differ
by SES. Low (high) SES students who receive low (high) grades confirm their priors,
and thus their posterior distributions have higher densities on low (high) ability levels.
Students who receive grades different from their priors form instead posterior distributions
with higher weight on intermediate values of ability.
Figure 4 shows the effect of early grading on effort choices in t2, by aggregate (low
or high) ability and SES. Results for each ability level, reported in Appendix A.3, are
useful to better interpret the aggregate picture. In the following I refer to both pictures.
Early grading changes optimal behavior in middle compulsory school only for high-SES
students: students who observe signals consistent with high-ability put higher effort (see
Figure A.11). As shown in Table 4, this is consistent with optimal education choice: for
high-ability students it is optimal to shift effort from late to middle compulsory school,
an overall reduction in effort due to the different lengths of the two periods. Low-SES
students do not react differently at this stage, independently of ability. Their priors are
lower, hence posteriors about ability are less sensitive to the high grades they observe.
In t3 all students are graded. Figure 5 shows that high-SES students with high-ability
strongly react to the additional grades, and put lower effort. Together with the reaction in
middle school, this can be overall interpreted as a negative “income effect”. High-ability
low-SES students react to early grades in the opposite way: they increase effort. Against
their priors, these students realize they are high-ability. They thus switch education and
effort choices (“a substitution effect”). Low-ability students reduce effort when graded
early on. Figure A.12 shows that the strongest reductions are found among low-SES
students. The aggregate effect for low-ability students masks a positive “income effect”
among lowest ability students. Figure A.12 shows that, when graded early on, these
students put more effort to reach the same education level they targeted (an “income
effect”). This effect is strongest among low-SES students.
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100.0
100.0
100.0
54.1 45.9
100.0
100.0
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
60.4 39.6
100.0
41.9 58.1
94.8 5.2
100.0
High-SES
Intermediate Effort Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Medium High
Figure 4: Intermediate effort choice by aggregate ability and SES for different grading
regimes
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in middle compulsory school. Results are presented
for high-ability students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-
ability students, whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors
about ability, and thus optimal choices.
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100.0
27.9 0.1 72.0
28.4 0.2 71.4
81.0 19.0
68.5 20.8 10.6
67.5 19.0 13.5
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
17.2 21.7 61.1
19.6 0.1 80.3
87.3 12.7
69.0 12.1 18.9
66.4 12.5 21.2
High-SES
Late Effort Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Low Medium High
Figure 5: Late effort choice by aggregate ability and SES for different grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in late compulsory school. Results are presented for
high-ability students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-
ability students, whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors
about ability, and thus optimal choices.
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4.2 Education
Figures 6 and A.13 show high school choices in the three information regimes. When
graded early on, low-ability students are less likely to choose academic education paths.
The effect is stronger for low-SES students. All high-ability students are instead more
likely to choose academic high school with early grades. Among students with high (not
top) ability, the reaction is stronger for high-SES students.
Figures 7 and A.14 show final education distributions for the different grading setups.
The effects of early grades mirror those observed for education choice. The main difference
is that some high (but not top) ability students with high-SES fail to attain college, and
only complete academic high school. These students observed signals consistent with top
ability early on, lowered effort, and thus failed to graduate from college (see Figure A.16).
No such effect is found for low-SES students, who are actually less likely to dropout of
both high school (see Figure A.15) and college (see Figure A.16).
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100.0
28.0 72.0
28.6 71.4
100.0
89.4 10.6
86.5 13.5
High-ability
Low-ability
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Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
17.2 82.8
19.7 80.3
100.0
80.9 19.1
78.8 21.2
High-SES
High School Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Vocational Academic
Figure 6: High school choice by aggregate ability and SES for different grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots high school choice distributions. Results are presented for high-ability
students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-ability students,
whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors about ability, and
thus optimal choices.
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Figure 7: Final education by aggregate ability and SES for different grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots final education distributions. Results are presented for high-ability stu-
dents, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-ability students,
whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors about ability, and
thus optimal choices.
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4.3 Summary of Results
In Table 5 I summarize the effects of early grading (the treatment) on education choices,
educational attainment, and income. The effects are reported for each ability and SES
group, and are compared to the baseline scenario (late grading, in brackets).
In general early grades lead to an overall reduction in effort.27 Only high-ability
low-SES students - for whom positive “substitution effects” prevail - increase effort when
graded early on. While the mean reduction in effort is the same for all low-ability students,
effects are qualitatively different by SES. As seen before, there are weaker negative “income
effects” for high-SES students, and stronger “income effects”, both positive and negative,
for low-SES students. The biggest negative “income effect” on effort is found for high-
ability high-SES students, who are the most sensitive to high grade signals.
Staying out of high school is never optimal in the model, even when students realize
they have lower ability than expected. The rational choice for these low-ability students
is to enroll into vocational school, and later drop out if they fall short of the required
preparation. This does not change with early grades, which instead have nontrivial effects
on high school track choices: all low ability-students are less likely to enroll into academic
tracks, and the opposite is true for high-ability students. Positive reactions are strongest
for high-SES students, while negative reactions are more pronounced for low-SES students.
Even if they reduced effort after observing early grades, all low-ability students benefit
of the early information, due to the different choices taken at the end of compulsory school:
dropout rates decrease, in particular for low-SES students. This translates one to one into
an increase in high school attainment. Finally, college attainment increases for high-ability
low-SES students, and slightly decreases for high-ability high-SES students.
In the long-run the effects of early grades on education translate into small increases
in lifetime income for all students, with the exception of high-ability high-SES students.
Effects on income are pretty small, and close to 0. Most of the gains in utility are due to
the early reductions in effort, so that early grading improves on average the welfare of all
students.
All in all the simulations show that assigning grades earlier leads to choices and edu-
cation outcomes more consistent with academic ability, with responses differing by SES.
Lowest ability students are more likely to increase effort when graded early on, espe-
cially if low-SES. Low to medium ability students reduce effort in compulsory school, in
particular if low-SES, but are more likely to choose vocational tracks, which they can
27I take a weighted average of middle and late effort choices in order to provide a more complete picture
on the effects of early grades on effort choice.
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complete. High-ability low-SES students increase effort in compulsory school, are more
likely to choose academic paths, and to attain college. For high-ability high-SES stu-
dents, “income effects” tend to prevail: these students put less effort when they observe
high grades, and some of them fail to graduate from college as a consequence.
Table 5: Summary of the effects of early grade assignment
Outcome: Low-Ability High-Ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Effort in late -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.07
compulsory school [1.92] [1.55] [1.62] [2.36] [2.51]
HS Enrollment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Academic track -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02
HS Enrollment [0.40] [0.13] [0.21] [0.71] [0.80]
HS Dropout -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.04] [0.08] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00]
Attains HS 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.96] [0.92] [0.94] [1.00] [1.00]
Attains College -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
[0.30] [0.00] [0.00] [0.71] [0.80]
Income (0-1 scale) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.75] [0.67] [0.68] [0.85] [0.88]
Utility 0.51 0.62 0.39 0.23 0.67
[117.01] [107.83] [107.20] [128.91] [133.17]
Values in brackets represent outcomes when only late grades are assigned. Effort is defined
on a 1-3 scale (1 is low effort). Income is a measure of lifetime income, and assumes
everybody starts working right after finishing their education or dropping out.
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5 Empirics
In this section I discuss identification of the effect of early grading on education choices.
I then briefly discuss inference in my setup, and lastly provide evidence on identifying
assumptions.
5.1 Identification
The decision to assign early grades was taken by municipal school boards, and, as previ-
ously discussed, correlates with the political color of the municipality. Treatment assign-
ment is thus likely not random with respect to education outcomes. A simple comparison
of outcomes between grading and non-grading municipalities would pick up systematic
differences between the two sets of municipalities, and thus bias OLS estimates.
In Appendix B.3 I test for differences in pre-treatment variables between graded and
non-graded municipalities in the 1967 cohort. Table B.7 shows that in graded munici-
palities children are less likely to be foreign born, score better in the ability tests, and
are less likely to switch classes over compulsory school. In terms of school level variables
(changes of teachers, class size, kindergarten) there are no big differences, in line with the
homogeneous nature of the Swedish education system. Parents in grading municipalities
(Tables B.8 to B.12) are less likely to divorce and more likely to be married. They are
slightly poorer, less educated, and more likely to be employed in low-skill jobs or agricul-
ture. When asked about how they chose math and English courses, and the priorities of
Swedish education, parents give very similar answers. Altogether it appears that there
are some small differences in determinants of education choice between the two sets of
municipalities. The differences in parental education seem to reflect a different structure
of the economy, rather than different preferences for education.
A simple cross-sectional comparison of outcomes for treated and untreated munici-
palities would likely lead to a negative bias, as treated units come from poorer and less
educated families. Given that I observe treatment and control group before and after the
final reform, when early grades were abolished, I can “control” for any persistent difference
between the two sets of municipalities. If outcomes trend in the same way in the two sets
of municipalities (parallel trends assumption), it is possible to single out the effect of early
grades. This ideal situation is pictured in Figure 8: while the two sets of municipalities
exhibit differences in outcomes unrelated to grade assignment, these differences are sta-
ble over time. Observed outcomes for the 1967 treated cohort can be compared to the
counterfactual outcomes that would have been observed for the same set of municipalities
absent the treatment (early grades). This counterfactual is given by ungraded munici-
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palities, as the trend is the same for sets of municipalities. The effect of early grading is
represented in the picture by the white arrow.
old cohorts
1967 cohort
Final 
Reform
Early 
Reform
1972 cohort
Ungraded 
in s.y.  6
Graded  
in s.y. 6
Figure 8: Difference in differences identification strategy
The empirical specification that implements the difference in differences identification
strategy is the following:
Yimc = α+ βasGradedm × 1967c + 1967c + Municm + ∆Ximc + imc (11)
a∈{Low ability, High ability}; s∈{Low SES, High SES},
where i indexes the individual, m the municipality, and c the cohort. Municm is a vector
of fixed effects that captures persistent cross-sectional differences between municipalities.
1967c is a dummy that controls for the trend in outcomes. The variable Gradedm× 1967c
picks up any differences in outcomes between grading and non-grading municipalities, that
are not persistent, or the same over time. Under the parallel trends assumption βas repre-
sents the causal effect of early grading. Consistently with the model, the effect is allowed
to differ by ability and SES, indexed respectively by a and s in equation 11. SES and
ability are measured respectively using parental education and ability tests administered
in school year 6.28
Any determinant of the outcome that changes over time in a different way between
the two sets of municipalities will be picked up by βas, and thus bias the coefficient.
Observable compositional change can be controlled for in the regression by adding a vector
of time varying pre-treatment controls, Ximc. These covariates also increase precision of
the estimates.
28Appendix B.1 provides further details on ability and SES measures, and on the way I discretize them to
match the model.
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5.2 Inference
Sample size is large (around 18000 observation), but the treatment, grade assignment,
varies at the municipal level. There are 29 municipalities in my sample, and half of them
are treated before the reform. I conservatively cluster standard errors at the municipal
level, rather than at the municipal-cohort level, which would result in twice as many
clusters.29 While the standard solution is to use cluster robust standard errors (Arellano,
1987; White, 1984), the number of clusters must be high for these standard errors to be
unbiased. Cameron et al (2008) show that cluster-robust standard errors are downward
biased in samples with few balanced (equally sized) clusters. They instead propose to use
Cluster Bootstrap-t methods with null hypothesis imposed, and show that these methods
yield the right p-values even with relatively few clusters (as few as 20). In a recent working
paper MacKinnon &Webb (2014) confirm the good performance of the Cluster Bootstrap-
t in the realistic case in which clusters are unbalanced. The Cluster Bootstrap-t is shown
to perform well when treatment has enough variance.
My sample consists of 29 municipalities, both small and big. Treatment is given by the
interaction between belonging to the cohort born 1967 and studying in an early grading
municipality, which holds for about a quarter of the sample. There are thus enough
clusters and treatment variation to believe that the Cluster Bootstrap-t should guarantee
unbiased p-values in my analysis. So in all my specifications I bootstrap p-values using
the method suggested by Cameron et al (2008). Finally, I use sample weights to recover
nationally representative estimates.
5.3 Testing for Identifying Assumptions
My difference in difference design identifies the causal effect of assigning early grades
under a specific set of assumptions. The most important one is the parallel trends as-
sumption: outcomes should trend similarly in both early and late grading municipalities.
The assumption is more credible when the treated and untreated populations are not so
different, especially in terms of “characteristics that are thought to be associated with the
dynamics of the outcome variable” (Abadie, 2005). This was discussed above, and shown
to be the case in Appendix B.3.
Appendix C.1 provides evidence for the parallel trend assumption. I first focus on
the vote share of right wing parties in municipal elections, which can be thought as the
treatment assignment. I show that the vote share of these parties is higher in the early
29This is suggested in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for the case of panels. My final dataset
is a cluster-panel, so there should be less correlation between clusters over time.
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grading municipalities. Causal identification in my design requires that this difference is
stable over time, so that it is controlled for by municipal fixed effects. This turns out to
be the case, and the formal test for parallel trends pass.
I then use administrative micro-level data to test whether parental background, edu-
cation, labor market, and intergenerational outcomes evolve in a similar way in the two
sets of municipalities. I run the tests on cohorts born 1972 onwards, who studied after
the final reform that abolished early grades. An important feature of these placebo tests
is that they are run on cohorts overlapping with those in my sample (the 1972 cohort is
included). If trends are parallel in this time window, then it is likely that the underlying
identifying assumption also holds for the cohorts in my sample. All tests appear to pass.
An important consideration is that restricting the analysis to 5-year windows appears
to be important for the validity of the identification strategy. This seems to be the case
in particular when considering long-run outcomes. There might indeed be an underlying
differential trend in the two sets of municipalities, if one considers cohorts living far apart
in time. This might explain the difference with respect to Sjögren (2010), whose placebo
tests for long-run outcomes fail when running the analysis on 20 cohorts of students.
A testable assumption of the identification strategy is that differences between treat-
ment and control group in determinants of the outcome should be stable over time (e.g.,
there should be no compositional change). In the same way, response rates should be the
same between treated and controls units over time (e.g., there should be no differential
attrition).30 In Appendix C.2 I test for differential attrition and compositional change
in the sample. First, there is no differential response to the student surveys and, impor-
tantly, I find no differential attrition in availability of SES and ability data. Second, it
appears that the cross-sectional differences between grading non-grading municipalities
are broadly stable over time. I do find compositional change in few specific parental
occupations and education levels. Therefore in my final specification I also control for
occupational dummies and parental education.31
A further assumption in the difference in differences setup is that the treated popu-
lation should not change as a reaction to treatment assignment. In my setup this means
that the students born 1967 should not enroll into different schools to get/avoid early
grades. As catchment areas determined the compulsory school the student attended, par-
ents had to relocate to a different municipality if they desired a different grading policy
for their children. Alternatively they could send their children to a private school. The
30Both compositional change and differential attrition can lead to biased difference in differences coefficients
(Blundell & Costa Dias, 2009).
31Results are robust to excluding income and parental controls. I include those variables to increase precision
of the estimates.
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first scenario seems highly unlikely; private schools were not common in that period.
Finally it is important for identification that treatment and control group do not
undergo different shocks over time. The presence of concurrent education reforms would
be a problem in my setup if they were implemented at the municipal level. During the
period I consider, schooling was quite centralized, with national curricula determining
most of school policies. There is thus little scope for additional policies being differentially
implemented in the two sets of municipalities. On top of that, the two cohorts I use in my
analysis received their education in a relatively stable educational system: Sweden had
already implemented the reforms of the 60s for the 9-year inclusive compulsory school,
while the market-oriented school reforms of the 90s did not affect these cohorts.32
6 Empirical Results
The outcome variables I use in the empirical analysis match outcomes in the model.
This allows me to understand whether empirical findings are consistent with students
learning about their academic ability from grades. I investigate the effect of early grades
on short-term effort choices, high school choices and attainment, and, finally, educational
attainment and income. Outside of the model, I also consider an alternative mechanism
through which grades might affect education choices: grades might motivate/demotivate
students, and thus affect their welfare.
I present difference in differences estimates from specification 11, which I re-parametrize
to directly get coefficients for each ability − SES cell. In all specifications I control for
ability (verbal and inductive ability normalized at the cohort-treatment level), basic de-
mographics (gender, birth year, foreign status, special education), SES (income, parental
occupation dummies, and education) and school-level variables (class size and teacher
changes). For every outcome I report the point estimate, the p-value in parentheses, and,
as a reference, the sample mean in brackets.33 There are two caveats when interpreting
results. First, estimates are not very precise, so I can not detect very small effects. Sec-
ond, I test many hypotheses, which in principle creates problems of false null rejection.
Notice that the two problems go in opposite directions, and that the multiple hypothesis
testing problem is less severe than it seems: most of the outcomes are strongly correlated,
or can be considered different proxies for the same underlying variable (e.g., grades and
course choices proxy for effort choice). Keeping this in mind, when I interpret results I
focus on the overall picture rather than on individual coefficients.
32The reforms are described respectively by Meghir & Palme (2005) and Björklund et al (2005).
33The wild cluster bootstrap with null imposed does not yield standard errors.
30
6.1 Effort in Compulsory School
In Tables 6 and 7 I investigate effects of early grades on school effort. The first Table
reports effects on math and English course choices, which can be interpreted both as
effort choices (academic courses are more challenging), and early school choices reflecting
future track selection (advanced courses are good preparation for academic high school).
The second Table reports effects on grades in late compulsory school, which are more
straightforward measures of school effort.34
Low-ability students, especially those with low-SES, reacted to early grade assignment
by switching to non-academic English, which can be interpreted as a reduction in effort
(columns 2 and 3 in Table 6). The switches appear in grade 8 and persist in school year
9. Switches in course choice are observed for English, but not for math. One possible
explanation is that parents and children already had feedback in math due to homework
and tests. At this time parents could probably test children’s math skills more than their
English proficiency.35 High-ability students did not revise course choices when graded
early on.
Low-ability low-SES students exhibit worse math performance when graded early on
(see column 2 and 3 of Table 7). High-ability high-SES students show instead higher
English and Swedish grades when they receive early grades. One can clearly see from the
standardized Swedish test, which exhibits more variation due to the different scale, that
all low-ability students performed worse after being assigned early grades, while high-
ability students performed better. Negative effects are stronger for low-SES students,
positive effects are instead more pronounced for the high-SES students. In the aggregate
no effect is found, as both positive and negative effects are summed up. This confirms
the importance of looking at heterogeneous effects.
The pattern found in the model is thus broadly reproduced by the data: low (high)
ability students are putting less (more) effort, and effects are stronger for low (high) SES
students. However, high-ability high-SES students are putting more effort, rather than
reducing it, as in the model. This implies that “substitution”, rather than “income effects”,
are prevailing. This can be easily rationalized within the model, assuming that college
majors with higher expected returns to education require more academic preparation, and
thus higher effort in school early on. It is then straightforward to see that these students
would react to high grades by further increasing effort.
34This is especially true of Swedish, a subject that does not involve course choices.
35The parents of the treated students were born in the 40s: at that time English proficiency was less
widespread among parents than it is now the case in Sweden.
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Table 6: Effects on course choices (school years 7-9):
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Advanced Math 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
(school year 7) (0.94) (0.70) (0.84) (0.50) (0.47)
[0.73] [0.54] [0.72] [0.90] [0.95]
Advanced Math -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.00
(school year 8) (0.80) (1.00) (0.26) (0.40) (0.94)
[0.66] [0.43] [0.64] [0.87] [0.96]
Advanced Math 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.05
(school year 9) (0.64) (0.74) (0.97) (0.58) (0.16)
[0.57] [0.32] [0.53] [0.76] [0.90]
Advanced English 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05
(school year 7) (0.90) (0.60) (0.88) (0.15) (0.21)
[0.75] [0.57] [0.76] [0.91] [0.97]
Advanced English -0.05** -0.06*** -0.07 -0.01 -0.01
(school year 8) (0.02) (0.01) (0.19) (0.48) (0.63)
[0.73] [0.53] [0.73] [0.91] [0.97]
Advanced English -0.06* -0.07** -0.08 -0.05 -0.01
(school year 9) (0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.14) (0.58)
[0.68] [0.46] [0.65] [0.87] [0.95]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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Table 7: Effects on grades (school years 8 and 9):
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Math Grade -0.02 -0.08* -0.04 0.05 0.07
(school year 8) (0.75) (0.07) (0.64) (0.14) (0.32)
[3.04] [2.70] [2.87] [3.35] [3.59]
Math Grade -0.11 -0.15** -0.13 -0.04 -0.06
(school year 9) (0.12) (0.02) (0.20) (0.68) (0.42)
[3.20] [2.86] [3.03] [3.54] [3.73]
English Grade 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.17***
(school year 8) (0.25) (0.98) (0.11) (0.79) (0.00)
[3.05] [2.70] [2.86] [3.37] [3.61]
English Grade 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.05 0.16***
(school year 9) (0.21) (0.57) (0.11) (0.48) (0.00)
[3.18] [2.82] [3.05] [3.46] [3.73]
Swedish Grade 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.17***
(school year 8) (0.47) (0.38) (0.58) (0.13) (0.00)
[3.06] [2.64] [2.91] [3.43] [3.68]
Swedish Grade 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.14** 0.18***
(school year 9) (0.17) (0.76) (0.64) (0.01) (0.01)
[3.17] [2.69] [3.03] [3.54] [3.86]
Swedish Test 0.18 -3.64*** -1.54** 4.49*** 6.14***
(school year 9) (0.84) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
[15.84] [13.43] [13.25] [19.96] [18.51]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. Math and English
pool together grades for advanced and general courses. All specifications control for basic de-
mographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort level) and parental
background.
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6.2 Education and Income
In Table 8, I report effects of early grades on high school choices, educational attainment,
and income. Contrary to what the model predicts, early grades do not lead to different
high school track choices. I observe instead an increase in enrollment for all students.36
While this can be surprising (on average low-ability students reduced effort in compulsory
school), it is possible that lowest ability students increased effort early on, and thus decided
to enroll into high school. This “income effect” was discussed in the model in Section 4.
When looking at educational attainment, I find an increase in high school attainment
at age 17-20 for high-ability low-SES students, mostly explained by a reduction in high
school dropout. In the long-run this effect becomes smaller and close to insignificant. A
possible explanation is that Swedish adult education programs, Komvux, allow adults to
complete their education. In the counterfactual scenario of late grading, students might
still have been able to finish their high school education. I find that low-ability low-SES
students are less likely to attain college. These effects are qualitatively consistent with
model’s predictions: a reduction in dropout due to higher effort in compulsory school,
and less low-ability students ending up with an academic education.
Why do the short-run effects of early grades do not pass on to high school track choice,
and why is educational attainment not affected for high SES-students? I propose as an
explanation that preferences for education might attenuate the effects of early grades. In
Appendix B.2 I show that, controlling for ability, academic high school enrollment rates
of high-SES students are 20 percentage points higher than those of low-SES students.
At the same time grade differences in late compulsory school between high- and low-SES
students are at most one fourth of a grade. SES appears thus to strongly influence high
school choices in Sweden, independently of ability.
While it is important to assess how early grades affect education outcomes to under-
stand mechanisms, a full evaluation of the policy requires looking at long-run outcomes.
Early grade assignment does not significantly affect income at ages 33-40, a good proxy
of lifetime income in the Sweden labor market (Börklund, 1993). This is consistent with
the theoretical model, which also generated very small effects on lifetime income. Early
grading leads instead to an increase in upward income mobility among low-ability low-SES
students, who displayed the strongest downward revisions in education choices.37
I conclude that, from the perspective of the labor market, early grades simply led to
a better match between ability and education choices. For low-ability low-SES students
36Notice that “high school enrollment” in my data also includes 1-year technical courses
37I consider upward mobile students those at least 15 percentile ranks above their parents’ income percentile
ranks.
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this implies a reduction of over-investment in education, and potentially an increase in
total earnings.
Table 8: Effects on high school choices, educational attainment and income:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
HS Enrollment 0.04** 0.03* 0.06** 0.03* 0.03**
(age 15-18) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
[0.89] [0.85] [0.92] [0.93] [0.97]
Academic HS Track 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
(age 15-18) (0.55) (0.82) (0.85) (0.68) (0.13)
[0.47] [0.20] [0.44] [0.59] [0.81]
HS Dropout 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.05** 0.02
(age 17-20) (0.98) (0.46) (0.53) (0.02) (0.34)
[0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08]
Attains HS 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.06*** -0.01
(age 17-20) (0.79) (0.49) (0.35) (0.01) (0.82)
[0.79] [0.72] [0.83] [0.86] [0.91]
Attains HS 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00
(age 33-40) (0.94) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.87)
[0.92] [0.88] [0.95] [0.96] [0.98]
College or more -0.02 -0.03* 0.02 -0.04 0.00
(age 33-40) (0.28) (0.06) (0.59) (0.23) (0.94)
[0.43] [0.22] [0.42] [0.52] [0.75]
Gross income 3.28 11.49 -3.64 -6.76 0.78
(age 33-40) (0.61) (0.21) (0.75) (0.62) (0.95)
[259.11] [223.88] [256.31] [269.89] [330.13]
↑ Income mobility 0.04** 0.08*** 0.02 0.01 0.02
(age 33-40) (0.02) (0.00) (0.54) (0.60) (0.60)
[0.34] [0.38] [0.27] [0.45] [0.28]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. HS Enrollment is
measured at ages 16-18, HS attainment at age 40. Income is measured at ages 33-40. ↑ Income
mobility is 1 when student income is 15 ranks above family income rank. All specifications control
for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort level) and
parental background.
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6.3 Student Welfare
Part of the policy debate in Sweden, and in other countries that considered early grades
abolition, revolved around the concern that grades might demotivate or motivate students
according to academic performance, which is known to strongly reflect SES, on top of
ability. Moreover grades might create a competitive environment where weak students
fare worse.
To validate this alternative mechanism I investigate the effects of early grading on self-
reported welfare measures. Outcomes are taken from the student surveys. The first survey
was administered in school year 6. It should pick up potential effects due to the potentially
more competitive and challenging environment. The second survey was assigned in school
year 10, and asked many retrospective questions about how children were feeling in late
compulsory school, when I observe most of the effects of early grades. Tables 9 and 10
show that, all in all, early grades did not significantly affect student welfare.38 The only
statistically significant effects are found for low-ability low-SES students, who are less
likely to report that they do well in school in school year 6, and also are less likely to
report that they enjoyed late compulsory school (school years 7-9). While the first finding
is not negative per se, since it reflects their lower school performance, the second one
might be more concerning for policy-makers. However similar outcomes pertaining to
school welfare show a 0 effect for these students, so I am more inclined to consider the
finding a spurious effect.
38As explained before I cannot detect small effects, but I can state that there appears to be no major effect.
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Table 9: Effects on behavior in school year 6:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
I do well in school -0.04 -0.07** -0.08 -0.01 0.03
(0.15) (0.02) (0.13) (0.71) (0.23)
[0.73] [0.61] [0.69] [0.84] [0.89]
Parents think I do -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.03
well in school (0.27) (0.17) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11)
[0.89] [0.84] [0.86] [0.94] [0.96]
I do my best, even -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
if boring (0.30) (0.29) (0.16) (0.77) (0.88)
[0.71] [0.73] [0.71] [0.71] [0.67]
I want to improve -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03
in school (0.91) (0.77) (0.53) (0.36) (0.51)
[0.59] [0.71] [0.66] [0.47] [0.44]
I dislike answering -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04*
questions (0.34) (0.21) (0.79) (0.87) (0.07)
[0.16] [0.21] [0.18] [0.14] [0.10]
I learn useless stuff 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.01
at school (0.69) (0.33) (0.37) (0.97) (0.80)
[0.38] [0.39] [0.38] [0.40] [0.34]
I get disappointed 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
if I get bad scores (0.65) (0.58) (0.33) (0.34) (0.26)
[0.68] [0.63] [0.70] [0.69] [0.75]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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Table 10: Effects on behavior in late compulsory school:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
I enjoyed grades -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01
7-9 (0.41) (0.07) (0.65) (0.69) (0.67)
[0.72] [0.71] [0.71] [0.75] [0.74]
I was worried in 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.00
grades 7-9 (0.79) (0.72) (0.65) (0.75) (0.98)
[0.12] [0.13] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
I am happy with 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
grades 7-9 (0.81) (0.89) (0.86) (0.65) (0.86)
[0.75] [0.68] [0.71] [0.82] [0.85]
I got help at home -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
in grades 7-9 (0.66) (0.52) (0.30) (0.62) (0.33)
[0.71] [0.67] [0.75] [0.68] [0.76]
I did my best even 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.00
if boring (0.62) (0.93) (0.14) (0.28) (1.00)
[0.47] [0.50] [0.47] [0.47] [0.45]
I did my best even -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02
if hard (1.00) (0.44) (0.17) (0.26) (0.55)
[0.71] [0.71] [0.70] [0.71] [0.74]
I learned useless 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01
stuff at school (0.19) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.84)
[0.53] [0.57] [0.52] [0.54] [0.47]
I was stressed at 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
school (0.65) (0.76) (0.86) (0.93) (0.39)
[0.20] [0.20] [0.22] [0.19] [0.19]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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7 Discussion
In this section I discuss how my results compare to previous literature on the effects of
grading information. Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2012) study dropout behavior in
Berea college, an institution with free tuition and subsidized boarding catering to dis-
advantaged students. They find that dropout is strongly explained by students revising
downward their priors on academic performance. Similarly Zafar (2011) finds that North-
western undergraduates revise downward their beliefs, and switch to easier majors, when
they observe grades lower than those they predicted. In Zafar’s paper the deviation be-
tween expected and realized academic performance is taken as an “information metric”
that identifies new information about students’ “own unobserved academic ability.” In
fact this information might reflect, as explicitly recognized in Stinebrickner’s paper, col-
lege preparation rather than academic ability. In both studies it is indeed not possible to
determine whether the updates are on academic ability or the stock of knowledge accu-
mulated. While both problems signal the need for better selection into college, from the
policy perspective they have quite different implications.39
The results of my paper are in line with the learning mechanism outlined by Stine-
brickner & Stinebrickner (2012) and Zafar (2011) at the college level. In particular, the
responses I find along the ability distribution are consistent with students revising their
priors about ability. With respect to their paper, my analysis improves on three dimen-
sions. First, in my setup grades were assigned when children were 10 years old, so there is
little concern that students learn about previous preparation, rather than academic abil-
ity. The detailed empirical analysis appears to support information as the main channel
through which grades affect education choices. Second, my paper shows both theoretically
and empirically that reactions to grades differs by SES. In the two papers above there
is no variation in SES: sampled students are either low-SES (Berea college) or high-SES
(Northwestern undergraduate students). Finally, my analysis also focuses on the long-
run effects of grading, and shows that inferring labor market outcomes from short-run
educational outcomes might be problematic.
My paper relates to the grading standards literature, which also stresses the role of
ability in students’ responses to grades. Becker & Rosen (1992) and Betts (1998) show
theoretically that higher grading standards encourage high ability students to put more
effort, while students below standard might be discouraged. Betts & Grogger (2003)
empirically confirm the heterogeneous effects of increasing grading standards at the high
39Failure in evaluating own ability calls for a revision of grading information. Failure in college preparation
requires to revise curricula in earlier education tiers.
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school level, while Figlio & Lucas (2004) find that higher standards lead to positive results
on test scores, with effects that depend on the ability of the student relative to the class.
In my setup, adding standardized grades on top of test scores could be construed as an
increase in grading standards. My results appear to be consistent with Betts (1998),
but I rule out motivation as the channel through which releasing additional grades affect
students choices, and instead find evidence consistent with an information story. While
in this paper I do not consider heterogeneous effects of grades by class ability, Facchinello
(2016) shows that students judge ability against their immediate peers, thus confirming
the mechanism outlined in Figlio & Lucas (2004).
The grading reform I analyze has been previously studied by Sjögren (2010), who uses
administrative data to study long-run effects (final education and income) of the overall
reform using difference in differences. She finds evidence of a positive effect of early grading
on educational attainment for girls. Contrary to my results, she finds a negative effect
on higher education for high-SES students. While the identification strategy is basically
the same, she needs to control for pre-trends to account for differences in educational
attainment found before and after the reform took place. A battery of refutability tests
shows identification in my paper to be robust. The difference in robustness is likely due
to the different cohorts and municipalities used in the analysis. Sjögren needs to assume
parallel trends over two decades, a period of time in which the probability the two sets
of municipalities underwent different shocks, biasing estimates, is higher. I use a sharper
design: I consider two nearby cohorts who were studying before and after the second
reform took place. I thus only need to assume parallel trends within a 5-year period, at
the cost of losing some precision in my estimates. Apart from identification, my paper
complements Sjögren (2010) in three ways. First, I study both long- and short-run effects
of early grades, which is possible due to the use of rich survey data. Second, I focus on
the mechanisms through which grades affect education choice, and show theoretically that
the effect of early grades might substantially differ along the ability and SES dimensions.
Third, I test empirically the predictions of my learning model, and confirm a nuanced
pattern broadly consistent with the learning mechanism posited in the model.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the effect of early grades on students’ education choices. I
exploit the staggered implementation of a curriculum reform, which postponed grade
assignment in Swedish compulsory school, to estimate both short- and long-run effects of
early grading. To investigate mechanisms I compare empirical results to the predictions
of a sequential choice learning model based on the setup.
In the model children are uncertain about academic ability, and their priors differ by
socioeconomic status (SES). Grades are ability signals that allow children to re-optimize
educational choices. The calibrated model shows that early grading results into choices
closer to first best for all students: low-ability students reduce effort in compulsory school,
and are more likely to enroll into and complete vocational high school. High-ability
students increase effort in school, and are more likely to choose academic education paths.
Stronger responses are found for students who observe information consistent with their
priors, so that effects differ by SES.
Empirical results are broadly in line with short-run model predictions. When graded
early on, low-ability low-SES students are more likely to get lower grades and switch to
easier courses in compulsory school. High-ability students, especially if high-SES, are
more likely to get higher grades in late compulsory school when graded early on. Against
model predictions, early grades do not affect high school track choices. The data suggests
that SES strongly influences high school enrollment choices in Sweden, potentially diluting
the effect of grades. I find that short-run effects on effort and course choices transmit to
educational attainment for low SES students. High school attainment increases by 6 pp
for high-ability low-SES students; college attainment decreases by 3 pp for low-ability
low-SES students. None of the effects found on education carry over to the labor market:
I find no effects on lifetime income, measured at ages 33-40. This suggests that early
grading information improves the match between early education choices and ability, and
reduces over-investment in education. Finally I find no evidence of demotivating effects
for low-ability or low-SES students, the main concern behind the grading reforms.
The key economic implication of my results is that students are uncertain about their
ability in early stages of education. This contrasts with the workhorse models of education
choice (Becker, 1994; Ben-Porath, 1967), that assume no ex-ante uncertainty in the returns
to non-compulsory education. From the policy point of view, I establish that early grading
leads to a better match between education and ability, but increases educational inequality
and reduces effort in compulsory school for low-ability students. Whether early grading
is a desirable policy depends thus on the objectives of the policy-maker.
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A Numerical Model
A.1 Evidence on assumptions and calibration
The model makes precise assumptions about choice protocols, the distribution of ability
in the population, school selection, and payoffs to education. In this section I provide
evidence supporting model assumptions, and discuss calibration.
The basic assumption underlying the model is that students are forward looking in
the education choices. Table A.1 reports summary statistics on the items that surveyed
students considered important when choosing high school. Apart from preferences for the
chosen program, the items that rank highest are study plans, ability and grades. This
shows that students were forward-looking in their choices, and considered feasibility of
the chosen track important in their choices.
Table A.1: Survey evidence on HS choice,
1967 cohort
Mean Obs
Chose HS after interest 0.80 6195
Chose HS after study plans 0.64 6099
Chose HS after ability 0.60 6093
Chose HS after grades 0.49 6117
Chose HS after parents 0.23 6099
Chose HS after peers 0.07 6098
Data from grade 10 survey. All variables rep-
resent agreement with the statement and are
coded from 0 to 1 (1 represents full agreement).
In the model high SES students are assumed to have higher levels of ability than
low SES students. Figure A.1 confirms this empirically.40 While low-SES students have
normal ability distributions, high-SES students display right-skewed distributions. In
Table A.2 I calibrate the data to the discrete distribution in column 1. The resulting
distributions by SES are then used to simulate ability distributions in the model.
40This is consistent with the evidence on early differences in ability through the socioeconomic gradient
shown by Cunha & Heckman (2009).
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Figure A.1: Differences in standardized ability by SES
Note: The SES division is based on parental education. Ability measures are taken from
tests administered in school year 6, and are standardized at the treatment-cohort level.
Table A.2: Distribution of discretized ability by
SES, 1967 cohort
All Low SES High SES
Lowest ability 0.10 0.13 0.06
Low ability 0.20 0.24 0.14
Medium ability 0.30 0.31 0.28
High ability 0.25 0.22 0.29
Highest ability 0.15 0.10 0.23
The population ability distribution is constrained
to the bins in column 1. The distributions by SES
are generated using the same cut-points.
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Figure A.2 shows ability levels by completed education. Students who attained high school
have higher ability than those who dropped out of high school school, or never enrolled.
Students who have a college education have much higher ability levels, which is consistent
with the assumptions I make in the model, and is not surprising given that college is
highly selective.
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Distribution of Ability by Final Education, 1967 Cohort
Figure A.2: Standardized ability by final attained education.
Note: Ability measures are taken from tests administered in school
year 6, and are standardized at the treatment-cohort level.
Table A.3 summarizes income premia for each education choice. While these are not
causal estimates, they might be representative of the information that young students use
when assessing their education goals. High school graduates exhibit higher incomes than
students with compulsory education. As assumed in the model, the income of students
with academic high school are not substantially different from those of students with vo-
cational high school. The wages of college graduates41 are instead quite higher. In Figure
A.3 I plot the wages of the students in the sample by discretized ability. There is little
variation in wages by ability for students with compulsory school or high school. However
there seems to be complementarity between income and ability for college graduates. In
the model I thus allow the wage premium for college to depend on ability, and use the
estimates as payoffs.
41Here including also 2-year short college
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Table A.3: Income by Final Education,
1967 Cohort
Completed education Gross Income Premium
Compulsory school 184.40 0.00
Vocational HS 221.21 0.20
Academic HS 226.22 0.23
College 290.67 0.58
Before-tax income measured at ages 33-40, in thou-
sands kronor
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Figure A.3: Average gross income by ability and attained
education, 1967 cohort
Note: Before-tax income measured at ages 33-40, in thousands kro-
nor. Ability is discretized to a 1-5 scale, as in the model.
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I calibrate the knowledge production function, kit = ωt(αai + βeit) + δkit−1, using the
following parameters:
Table A.4: Production Function Parameters
weights coefficients
ω1 = 4/10 α = 1
ω2 = 1/10 β = 2.5
ω2 = 5/10 δ = 1.1
Table A.5 reports minimum effort and ability levels required to access and attain each
education level. The knowledge thresholds are found substituting the values for each
education level into equation 12:
k3 = αa× (ω1δ2 + ω2δ + ω3) + β(ω1δ2 × e1 + ω2δ × e2 + ω3 × e3). (12)
Table A.5: Minimum ability and effort for Educational Attainment (Knowledge
Thresholds)
k¯E2 kE3 k¯E3 k¯E4
a 2 3 3 4
e1 Medium Medium Medium Medium
e2 Medium Medium Medium Medium
e3 Low Low Medium High
The value of vocational school, V E2i,t , was shown in Section 3.1 to be:
V E2i,τ =
∑3
t=τ −ωτ × γE(e
E2?
it,τ )
γ¯E + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2) (13)
+P (k˜i3,τ < k¯
E2)U((L− 1)× w1)).
The parameters I use for effort disutility are: γ
E
= 6 and γ¯E = 1.6. The parameters
for income utility, U(I) = γ
I
(IE2?i )
γ¯I , are: γ
I
= 2.8 and γ¯I = 0.9. Effort costs are thus
convex, and income utility is concave.
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In the model high-ability students are more likely to observe higher grades than low-
ability students do when graded early on. I confirm this in Figure A.4, where I plot
grades at the end of school year 6 (the treatment) for treated students born 1967. Vertical
dash-dot lines represent average grades by SES: they could be considered the prior grade
students are expected to get, before information about ability is revealed. For low-SES
students the average grade is closer to the low-ability students mean. The opposite is true
for high-SES students. This reflects the different distribution of ability by SES.
Table A.6: Factors Affecting HS admission,
Cohort 1967
Admitted in HS
at first Choice
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.05***
(0.01)
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.00
(0.02)
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 0.04***
(0.01)
English Grade (s.y. 9) 0.02***
(0.01)
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 0.03***
(0.01)
Mean 0.83
R2 0.05
Observations 7884
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The data does not record which type of
school the student was applying for. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the class level.
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Figure A.4: Grades by Ability and SES in school year 6
Note: Distributions over-smoothed for illustrational clarity. Dash-dot vertical
lines represent averages for each SES cell. The other vertical lines represent
averages for each ability−SES cell.
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Finally In the model I assume that grades are unbiased. In Table A.7 I try to assess
this empirically. While there is a strong relationship between the standardized test and
the final grade (the coefficient is close to 1), it appears that SES has an independent
positive effect on final grades, controlling for ability. This could be due to a positive bias
towards wealthier students, but could also be related to the fact that high-SES students
put more effort into schooling. Given that final grades corrected for discrepancies between
yearly and test performance, it is still possible that they are unbiased. Notice that the
magnitude of this higher bound effect is actually small: one child over ten/twenty gets a
higher grade if categorized as high-SES with respect to a low-SES child.
Table A.7: Testing for biases in final grade assignment
Adv Math grade
(year 9)
Adv English grade
(year 8)
Regressor of interest:
High-SES 0.09*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Controls:
Normalized test score 0.69*** 0.63***
(0.01) (0.01)
Normalized ability 0.06*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.01)
1967 cohort –0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.60 0.60
Observations 6535 8867
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Normalized test score and ability refer to math tests in column 1,
and English tests in column 2. The SES division is based on parental
education. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
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A.2 Solution Method
Simulation of ability signals
I extract true ability and unbiased ability signals (See Figure A.5) from a multivariate
normal with covariance matrix: 1 0 00 σ21() 0
0 0 σ22()

I discretize the normal draws using the SES-specific distributions shown in Table A.2. I
assume the following:
• The grade signals are a sum of true ability and noise:
◦ gi2 = ai + 2 with 2 ∼ N
(
0, σ22()
)
◦ gi3 = ai + 3 with 3 ∼ N
(
0, σ23()
)
◦ cov(ai, 2) = cov(ai, 3) = cov(2, 3) = 0
• Late grades are more precise than grades assigned in school year 6:
◦ corr(ai, gi2) = 0.7
◦ corr(ai, gi3) = 0.8
I need to find σ21() and σ22() such that k2 = corr(ai, gi2) = 0.7 and k3 = corr(ai, gi3) =
0.8: kt = corr(ai, git) = corr(ai, ai + t) =
1 + 0
σ(ai) + σ(ai + t)
=
1
σ(ai)× σ(ai + j) =
1
σ(ai + j)
and σ2(ai+t) = 1+σ2t (). So kt =
1√
1 + σ2t ()
, thus σ2t () =
1
k2t
−1. Because
σ2(ai+ t) =
1
k2t
it follows that corr(gi2, gi3) =
cov(ai + 2, ai + 3)
σ(ai + 2)× σ(ai + 3) =
1√
1
k22
×
√
1
k23
=
k2 × k3.
I simulate the joint ability and grade distributions 1000 times to get three sets of
posterior distributions:
• f(ai|gi2, SES), plotted in Figure A.6
• f(ai|gi3, SES), plotted in Figure A.7
• f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES), plotted in Figures A.8 and A.9
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Figure A.5: Ability and grade signals in t2
Note: The Figure plots simulated distributions of ability and grades in middle compulsory school,
for low- and high-SES students.
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Solution strategy
I solve by backward induction the optimization problem in three different information
scenarios:
1. In the case of full information about ability (first best). The solution is found for
5 ability levels. SES has no role in individual choice, but aggregate outcomes will
differ due to the different distribution of ability by SES.
2. When only late grades are released. The solution is found for 2 (SES) x 5 (gi3) =
10 cases.
3. When early grades are released. The solution is found for 2 (SES) x 5 (gi2) x 5 (gi3)
= 50 cases
Solution when early grades are assigned
At the end of t3 choose optimally E?, given any [SES, ei1, gi2, ei2, gi3, ei3] vector. There
are (2 x 3 x 5 x 3 x 5 x 3) x 3 = 4050 cases. 1350 solutions are optimal, given
f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES). In the same stage choose optimally ei3, given any [SES, ei1, gi2, ei2, gi3]
vector. There are (2 x 3 x 5 x 3 x 5) x 3 = 1350 cases. 450 solutions are optimal given
f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES).
In t2 choose optimally ei2, given any realized [SES, ei1, gi2] vector. Use f(ai|gi2, SES)
to assign the proper weight to each of the 5 potential grades that can be assigned in t3.
Emax2 thus summarizes 450 cases into 450/5=90 cases, before gi2 is assigned. There are
indeed (2 x 3 x 5) x 3 = 90 cases. 30 solutions are optimal, given f(ai|gi2, SES).
In t1 choose optimally e1, given [SES]. Use f1(ai) to assign the proper weight to
each of the 5 potential grades that might be assigned in t2. Thus Emax1 summarizes
30 cases into 30/5=6 cases, before grades are assigned. There are indeed (2) x 3 = 6
cases. 2 solutions are optimal, given f1(ai), one for each SES. So in the end I find 2 x 25
[e?1, e
?
2, e
?
3, E
?] contingent plans, for each SES and ability signal realized.
Solution when late grades are assigned
At the end of t3 choose optimally E?, given any [SES, ei1, ei2, gi3, ei3] vector. There are
(2 x 3 x 3 x 5 x 3) x 3 = 810 cases. 270 cases are optimal, given f(ai|gi3, SES). In t3
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choose optimally ei3, given any [SES, ei1, ei2, gi2] vector. There are (2 x 3 x 3 x 5) x 3 =
270 cases. 90 solutions are optimal given f(ai|gi3, SES).
In t1 and t2 choose optimally [ei1,, ei2], given SES. Use f1(ai) to assign the proper
weight to each of the 5 potential grades (mirroring ability type) that can be assigned in t3.
Thus Emax1 summarizes 90 cases into 90/5=18 cases, before grades are assigned. There
are indeed (2 x 3) x 3 = 18 cases. 2 solutions are optimal given f1(ai), one for each SES.
So in the end I find 2 x 5 [e?1, e?2, e?3, E?] contingent plans, for each SES and ability signal
realized.
Realizations
I append the datasets created in the simulation phase, and take a random sample. I merge
the final dataset to first and second best solutions. The merge is on [SES, gi2, gi3] for the
solution with early grades, [SES, gi3] for the solution with late grades, and [ai] for the
first best. I use true ability, the knowledge production function, and education thresholds,
to determine final outcomes. This gives me a distribution of realized outcomes for each
SES and ability level. At this point I can assess how the information structure affects
final outcomes.
A.3 Additional Simulation Results
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Figure A.15: High school dropout by grading regime
Note: The Figure plots high school dropout rates under early or late grade assignment. Notice
that with full information dropout is never optimal. High-ability students never drop out of high
school, due to their high levels of ability.
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Figure A.16: College dropout by grading regime
Note: The Figure plots college dropout rates under early or late grade assignment. Notice that
with full information dropout is never optimal.
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A.4 Model and Institutional Setup
Table A.8 compares the model to the institutional setup in terms of choices, selection and
information. While I designed the model around the institutional setup, there still are
some differences.
Table A.8: Model and empirical setup
Model Empirical setup
Early Compulsory choose e1, no grades choose effort in s.y. 1-5, no grades
Middle Compulsory choose e2, (no) grades choose effort in s.y. 6 (no) grades
Late Compulsory choose e3, grades choose effort/courses in s.y. 7-9, grades
High school Selection k¯E3 GPA, course choices
College Selection E3, k¯E4 Academic HS, GPA, quotas
First, students in the sample have an additional choice with respect to the model:
type of course in late compulsory school. As advanced courses are more difficult than
general ones, this type of choice can be interpreted as an effort choice. At the same these
choices are relevant for admission into academic high school. Table A.6 confirms this
empirically: choosing advanced math in grade 9 and having higher grades substantially
affects the probability of admission to the preferred high school choice. The magnitudes of
the coefficients are lower bounds, as I am including students who only apply to vocational
tracks.42
Second, in the model I assume that students need to meet absolute knowledge thresh-
olds to complete college. In my setup a quota system is in place: an increase in college
enrollment could in principle affect the admission threshold for all students. These general
equilibrium effects are not captured in my model, where the number of students who can
complete college is a function of the ability distribution. Öckert (2002) finds that the
difference in years of education between students screened out and admitted at college
in the early 80s in Sweden is about 0.6. The difference reduces to just 0.20 years when
comparing students with similar number of admission credits.43 This in turn is a good
approximation to the marginal change in admission requirements that might be triggered
by a reshuﬄing of the pool seeking college admission after grades are assigned. Given the
size of the change results would likely not change significantly allowing for the general
equilibrium effect.
42I have no information on the track the student applied for.
43See Öckert (2010), published version of the IFAU working paper.
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B Descriptives
B.1 Definition of Ability and SES
In this section I discuss how I measure ability and SES, and describe how I discretize
them to match the model.
Students took during the spring term of school year 6 a battery of three standardized
ability tests: a test of verbal ability, requiring to find the opposite to a word among a
list of four alternatives; a test of inductive ability, requiring to complete a number series
of 6 terms with two more numbers; a test of spatial ability, requiring to find the three-
dimensional representation of a two-dimensional picture that can be folded. The tests
taken by the two cohorts are exactly the same, and the distributions look similar over
time (see Figure B.1).
Students had respectively 15, 27 and 22 seconds to answer each section of the test,
assuming they wasted no time at all in the test. The fast pace of the test adds to the
quality of the ability measures: Borghans et al. (2008) show that reducing the time
available for completing intelligence tests reduces differences in effort between students
with different non-cognitive traits.
I create a standardized aggregate index of ability from the z-scores of inductive and
verbal ability. I label high-ability those students who scored at least at the 60th percentile
of the ability distribution. Consistently with the model, the cutoff roughly corresponds
to the median ability of students who attained college education.44
When performing the normalization at the cohort level, ability measures turn out to
be 5% of a standard deviation higher in the treatment group, with respect to the control
group. For the 1972 cohort there is no such difference. While the main treatment is grade
assignment in school year 6, in principle there might be differences in grade assignment
also in school year 3, when students were age 10 (see discussion in Section 2.3). Ability
could thus have been affected by the treatment. However the literature (e.g., Heckman et
al., 2007) reports that cognitive ability should be stable by that age. The ability measures
were taken in May of 1981 for the 1967 cohort, quite close to the final tests used for grade
assignment. It is possible that test taking behavior was instead affected in the treated
municipalities. Students may have thought that the ability tests were relevant to the final
grades, or may have put more effort in the tests simply because they were affected by the
more competitive environment.45 This is consistent with results from the literature on
the effect of non-cognitive traits on test taking behavior (Borghans et al., 2008). In order
44I leave out of the index spatial ability, as it poorly correlates with academic choices or outcomes.
45Jalava et al. (2015) show that rank-based grading positively affects effort during tests
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to have more consistent ability measures I thus normalize ability at the cohort-treatment
level, and basically use a measure of relative ability in the analysis. This avoids any
problem of endogeneity or differential reporting caused by grade assignment.
Extensive investigation of which SES measure is most predictive of education choice
shows that parental education strongly predicts children’s education choices. Parental
income is less predictive of education choice. Measures based on parental occupation yield
results similar to parental education. My preferred measure of SES is based on parental
education. Occupation-based measures are more difficult to discretize into dummies, and
are recorded in my data using a definition that slightly changes between cohorts.46 Finally,
I consider high-SES those students who have at least one parent with academic high school
(about 40% of my sample).
46Results do not change that much when using the alternative SES definition
72
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
0 10 20 30 40
x
Verbal ability Spatial ability Inductive ability
Distribution of Ability, 1967 Cohort
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
0 10 20 30 40
x
Verbal ability Spatial ability Inductive ability
Distribution of Ability, 1972 Cohort
Figure B.1: Absolute ability distributions
Note: Ability measures are taken from tests administered in school year 6.
The tests are the same for both cohorts.
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B.2 Education Choices, Grades and Outcomes
In the following I provide descriptive evidence on students’ choices and educational at-
tainment, the main outcomes in the empirical analysis.
Table B.1: Education choices and outcomes by ability and SES,
cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Compulsory:
Adv Math (s.y. 7) 0.56 0.73 0.92 0.97
Adv Math (s.y. 8) 0.44 0.62 0.87 0.95
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.32 0.51 0.75 0.88
Adv English (s.y. 7) 0.57 0.77 0.93 0.98
Adv English (s.y. 8) 0.53 0.74 0.90 0.97
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.47 0.66 0.86 0.95
Non Compulsory:
HS Enroll 0.85 0.92 0.93 0.98
Academic HS Enroll 0.22 0.45 0.60 0.82
HS Dropout 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.09
Attain Academic HS 0.19 0.39 0.56 0.75
Attain College 0.19 0.39 0.48 0.72
Each variable is a dummy.
Table B.1 shows that high-ability and high-SES students are more likely to make
choices consistent with an academic education path. This pattern suggests that the
Swedish education system (grading, tracking and funding) successfully managed to al-
locate the most skilled students to higher education levels, but SES remained a relevant
factor in the process, possibly distorting the efficient allocation of skill to human capital.
While these differences are less marked for high-ability students up to compulsory school,
low-SES students are 20 p.p. less likely to choose an academic education, independently
of ability. As there might still be differences in ability between SES categories, in Table
B.2 I report coefficients for the differences in choices between high- and low-SES students,
controlling for ability. The picture does not change that much, but it appears that the
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Table B.2: Differences in choices by SES
controlling for ability, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Compulsory:
Adv Math (s.y. 7) 0.11 0.04
Adv Math (s.y. 8) 0.12 0.07
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.13 0.10
Adv English (s.y. 7) 0.14 0.04
Adv English (s.y. 8) 0.15 0.06
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.14 0.07
High School:
HS Enroll 0.06 0.04
Academic Enroll 0.19 0.18
HS Dropout –0.05 –0.00
Attain Academic HS 0.17 0.16
College:
College 0.17 0.21
Each variable is a dummy. College enrollment is defined
as enrolling into a tertiary education program lasting at
least 2 years.
differences among low ability students are in part due to low-SES students having less
ability. I still confirm that low-SES students are much less likely (a 18 p.p. difference) to
choose an academic education path than their high-SES counterparts.
To understand whether differences in education choices and educational attainment
are related to school performance, I report in Table B.3 average grades by ability and
SES. Grades are consistently higher for high-ability and high-SES students. However
grade differences between high- and low-SES students with similar ability levels are not
so big. When considering grades in school year 6, and Swedish grades in school year 9
(which do not reflect course choice), differences are at most 13th of a grade. Table B.4
reports grade differences by SES controlling for ability. The picture remains similar: grade
differences among students with similar ability levels are at most 14th of a grade. This
suggests that SES plays a fundamental role in education choice in Sweden, potentially
reflecting different motivation and preferences for education among students.
Table B.5 shows that many students switch courses over time. Students are more
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Table B.3: Grades by ability and SES, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Swedish Grade (s.y. 6) 2.64 2.93 3.67 3.97
Swedish Grade (s.y. 7) 2.61 2.86 3.40 3.63
Swedish Grade (s.y. 8) 2.64 2.88 3.46 3.72
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 2.69 3.01 3.56 3.89
Math Grade (s.y. 6) 2.66 2.97 3.80 3.98
Math Grade (s.y. 7) 2.64 2.78 3.38 3.61
Math Grade (s.y. 8) 2.69 2.86 3.37 3.61
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 2.83 3.00 3.51 3.72
English Grade (s.y. 6) 2.64 2.98 3.65 4.02
English Grade (s.y. 7) 2.69 2.84 3.33 3.63
English Grade (s.y. 8) 2.68 2.86 3.37 3.63
English Grade (s.y. 9) 2.80 3.06 3.45 3.76
Grades are expressed on a 1-5 norm-referenced scale. Math and English grades
in s.y. 8 and 9 pool together advanced and general courses.
likely to switch from academic to general courses than the opposite, and there are more
switches in math.47 Switches from one type of course to the other can be interpreted as
revision of choice, and imply that students do not have full information over own ability (or
knowledge). It is also interesting to see that the switching behavior continues through all
grades: most of the students switch in school year 8, but some also switch in the last year.
This is consistent with students revising some sort of prior, with the updating process
continuing over time. In Table B.4 I provide descriptive evidence on how SES affects the
choice of switching from an advanced to a general course in compulsory school. When
comparing the choices of low- and high-SES students with the same grades and ability, I
find that SES still influences switching choices. This suggests that grading information
might affect differently students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.
47This is consistent with research finding that students tend to be overly optimistic about own abil-
ity/preparation in higher education (see Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012; Zafar, 2011)
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Table B.4: Differences in grades by SES
controlling for ability, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Swedish Grade (s.y. 6) 0.18 0.21
Swedish Grade (s.y. 7) 0.16 0.15
Swedish Grade (s.y. 8) 0.15 0.17
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 0.22 0.24
Math Grade (s.y. 6) 0.18 0.11
Math Grade (s.y. 7) 0.07 0.14
Math Grade (s.y. 8) 0.11 0.16
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 0.10 0.14
English Grade (s.y. 6) 0.22 0.27
English Grade (s.y. 7) 0.07 0.21
English Grade (s.y. 8) 0.11 0.16
English Grade (s.y. 9) 0.20 0.21
Grades are expressed on a 1-5 norm-referenced scale.
Math and English grades in s.y. 8 and 9 pool together
advanced and general courses.
Table B.5: Fraction of students
switching courses, 1967 cohort
Grade 8 Grade 9
Math:
Switches to gen choice 0.12 0.17
Switches to adv choice 0.04 0.01
English:
Switches to gen choice 0.06 0.08
Switches to adv choice 0.07 0.03
Switches are conditional on previous year’s course
choice.
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Table B.6: Impact of SES on the stability
of course choices, 1967 Cohort
Sticks to adv Math Sticks to adv Eng
Regressors of interest:
High-SES 0.06*** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Controls:
Grade (s.y. 8) –0.00 –0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Grade (s.y. 7) 0.21*** 0.18***
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized verbal ability 0.02** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized inductive ability 0.02** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized spatial ability 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
E[Y] 0.73 0.86
R2 0.27 0.21
Observations 5532 5653
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Outcome: student sticks in s.y. 9 to the course choice made in s.y. 7. The
SES division is based on parental education. Standard errors clustered at
the class level.
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B.3 Treated and Control Municipalities
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Figure B.2: Vote share of right-wing parties in municipal elections by treatment status
Note: This Figure plots the aggregated vote share of right-wing parties in the 1979 municipal
elections. Municipalities assigning early grades had a higher share of right-wing voters.
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Figure B.3: Sampled municipalities
Note: Municipalities assigning early grades before the reform are
colored in black
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Table B.7: Differences in students background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Female 0.48 0.50 -0.02
(0.62) (0.55) (0.01)
Birth year 66.98 66.97 0.02*
(0.25) (0.24) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.02 0.05 -0.03***
(0.14) (0.24) (0.01)
Both parents not Nordic 0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.11) (0.13) (0.01)
Verbal ability 23.22 22.70 0.52*
(7.60) (6.60) (0.28)
Inductive ability 22.85 21.78 1.07***
(10.25) (8.92) (0.38)
Spatial ability 23.82 23.41 0.41
(8.94) (7.91) (0.28)
Kindergarten 0.91 0.93 -0.02
(0.34) (0.28) (0.03)
Quiet home environment 0.95 0.95 -0.00
(0.28) (0.25) (0.01)
Switched Class (G6-G9) 0.06 0.08 -0.03***
(0.27) (0.30) (0.01)
Special Education 0.12 0.14 -0.02
(0.41) (0.39) (0.02)
Changes of teacher 0.59 0.53 0.05
(1.20) (1.00) (0.14)
Hours absent in grade 6 7.89 6.82 1.07
(11.94) (8.23) (1.26)
Class size 23.64 23.27 0.37
(6.64) (5.18) (0.75)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Ability measures are on a 0-40 scale. Standard errors clustered at
the municipal level.
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Table B.8: Differences in parental SES
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Disposable family income (age 11-16) 243.69 253.82 -10.13**
(101.46) (84.98) (4.87)
High Income 0.47 0.54 -0.07**
(0.62) (0.55) (0.03)
High Education 0.36 0.44 -0.08**
(0.60) (0.54) (0.03)
High Income/Educ 0.59 0.68 -0.09***
(0.62) (0.51) (0.03)
High SES 0.41 0.46 -0.05
(0.61) (0.55) (0.04)
Parents: non-skilled workers, goods 0.10 0.09 0.01
(0.39) (0.33) (0.02)
Parents: non-skilled workers, service 0.11 0.09 0.02**
(0.39) (0.31) (0.01)
Parents: skilled workers, goods 0.17 0.19 -0.02
(0.47) (0.43) (0.02)
Parents: skilled workers, service 0.02 0.02 -0.00
(0.18) (0.16) (0.01)
Parents: lower non-manual ii 0.04 0.05 -0.00
(0.25) (0.22) (0.01)
Parents: lower non-manual i 0.09 0.09 0.00
(0.35) (0.30) (0.01)
Parents: intermediate-level non-manual 0.19 0.23 -0.03**
(0.49) (0.46) (0.01)
Parents: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.11 0.13 -0.01
(0.39) (0.36) (0.02)
Parents: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00)
Parents: entrepreneur 0.11 0.10 0.01
(0.39) (0.33) (0.01)
Parents: farmer 0.05 0.02 0.04***
(0.30) (0.16) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Income in 1000 kr, measured when the student was 11-16. Occupation variables
are taken from the 1980 Census. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table B.9: Differences in father background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Father not Nordic 0.03 0.03 -0.01
(0.19) (0.20) (0.01)
Married father 0.81 0.77 0.04***
(0.49) (0.46) (0.01)
Father SES, 1 (low) to 3 (high) 1.73 1.75 -0.02
(0.87) (0.79) (0.05)
Divorced father 0.15 0.18 -0.03**
(0.45) (0.42) (0.01)
Father educ: compulsory school or less 0.47 0.41 0.06**
(0.62) (0.54) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.38 0.41 -0.04**
(0.60) (0.54) (0.02)
Father educ: college or more 0.16 0.18 -0.02
(0.45) (0.42) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.90 0.90 0.00
(0.36) (0.33) (0.01)
Father: unemployed 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.24) (0.20) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table B.10: Differences in mother background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Mother not Nordic 0.04 0.05 -0.01
(0.21) (0.23) (0.01)
Married mother 0.77 0.72 0.04***
(0.52) (0.49) (0.02)
Divorced mother 0.16 0.19 -0.04**
(0.45) (0.43) (0.01)
Mother SES, 1 (low) to 3 (high) 1.55 1.62 -0.06
(0.76) (0.68) (0.05)
Mother educ: compulsory school or less 0.42 0.41 0.01
(0.61) (0.54) (0.03)
Mother educ: high school 0.41 0.41 0.00
(0.62) (0.54) (0.02)
Mother educ: college or more 0.17 0.18 -0.01
(0.47) (0.42) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.91 0.90 0.01
(0.36) (0.34) (0.01)
Mother: unemployed 0.04 0.03 0.01*
(0.25) (0.19) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table B.11: Differences in father occupation
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Father: non-skilled workers, goods 0.12 0.12 0.01
(0.42) (0.35) (0.02)
Father: non-skilled workers, service 0.10 0.08 0.03***
(0.38) (0.29) (0.01)
Father: skilled workers, goods 0.21 0.23 -0.02
(0.50) (0.46) (0.02)
Father: skilled workers, service 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.00)
Father: lower non-manual ii 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.21) (0.17) (0.00)
Father: lower non-manual i 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.32) (0.29) (0.01)
Father: intermediate-level non-manual 0.18 0.22 -0.04**
(0.47) (0.45) (0.02)
Father: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.11 0.12 -0.02
(0.38) (0.36) (0.02)
Father: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.00)
Father: entrepreneur 0.11 0.10 0.01
(0.39) (0.32) (0.01)
Father: farmer 0.06 0.02 0.03**
(0.30) (0.17) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Occupation variables are taken from the 1980 Census. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level.
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Table B.12: Differences in mother occupation
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Mother: non-skilled workers, goods 0.05 0.06 -0.00
(0.27) (0.26) (0.01)
Mother: non-skilled workers, service 0.37 0.36 0.02
(0.60) (0.53) (0.03)
Mother: skilled workers, goods 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.14) (0.15) (0.01)
Mother: skilled workers, service 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.31) (0.25) (0.01)
Mother: lower non-manual ii 0.11 0.14 -0.03*
(0.39) (0.38) (0.01)
Mother: lower non-manual i 0.09 0.11 -0.02
(0.34) (0.33) (0.01)
Mother: intermediate-level non-manual 0.16 0.16 -0.00
(0.47) (0.40) (0.01)
Mother: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.25) (0.21) (0.01)
Mother: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Mother: entrepreneur 0.05 0.04 0.00
(0.28) (0.23) (0.01)
Mother: farmer 0.05 0.02 0.03***
(0.28) (0.15) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Occupation variables are taken from the 1980 Census. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level.
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Table B.14: Differences in parental school preferences
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
School priority: Teach Math and Swedish 8.21 8.06 0.14**
(1.73) (1.63) (0.06)
School priority: Develop collaborative skills 6.64 6.70 -0.06
(2.26) (2.02) (0.09)
School priority: Teach other subjects 6.03 6.01 0.02
(2.35) (1.99) (0.07)
School priority: Develop critical thinking 5.95 6.17 -0.22**
(2.62) (2.33) (0.10)
School priority: Teach Foreign languages 5.46 5.61 -0.16
(2.57) (2.19) (0.14)
School priority: Inform about working life 4.53 4.64 -0.11
(2.36) (2.20) (0.11)
School priority: Teach children to obey adults 3.65 3.42 0.23*
(2.93) (2.49) (0.13)
School priority: Cope in a competitive society 3.57 3.62 -0.05
(2.58) (2.23) (0.08)
School priority: Select for higher education 1.79 1.80 -0.01
(1.84) (1.66) (0.07)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variables are on a 1-9 scale (9 = top priority). Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level.
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Table B.13: Differences in parents choice protocols
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Electives chosen for: child ability 0.62 0.61 0.02
(0.60) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: child preferences 0.37 0.39 -0.02
(0.61) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: more choice in HS 0.37 0.38 -0.00
(0.61) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: entrance requirements 0.24 0.26 -0.01
(0.53) (0.48) (0.01)
Electives chosen for: teacher suggestion 0.04 0.07 -0.03***
(0.24) (0.28) (0.01)
Electives chosen for: classmates choice 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.12) (0.13) (0.00)
Electives chosen for: other 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.12) (0.12) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variables represent agreement with the statement on a 0-1 scale. Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level.
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C Refutability Tests
C.1 Tests for Parallel Trends
In Figure C.1 and Table C.1, I test for parallel trends in the aggregate vote share of right-
wing parties in municipal elections, held every 4 years in Sweden. The share of right-
wing votes, higher in early grading municipalities, can be considered as the “treatment
assignment”. It is reassuring to see that the difference keeps stable over time. This grants
that institutional differences between the two sets of municipalities, which might affect
educational outcomes, are controlled for by the municipality fixed effects.
Figures C.2 to C.20 consider parental background, education choices, labor market and
intergenerational outcomes for cohorts born 72 to 83, who studied after the final reform
that abolished early grades. I use these cohorts to run placebo tests: if the identifying
assumption holds, I should not see any effect in the diff-in-diff coefficient. The upper
panel of each picture shows trends for early and late grading municipalities. The lower
panel shows coefficient and 95% confidence interval from eight difference-in-differences
placebo regressions. I run each test on a 5-year window centered on the year marked,
controlling for a linear trend. This allows me to test the assumption that underlies my
specification: over a 5-year window there should be no differential trend in the outcomes
(or their determinants) between treated and control municipalities. In terms of inference,
I have around 19000 students per cohort, so each test uses around 95000 observations.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
Three facts should be stressed at this point. First, these placebo tests are run on
cohorts overlapping with those in my sample (the 1972 cohort is included). If trends are
parallel in this time window, then it is likely that the underlying identifying assumption
also holds for the cohorts in my sample. Second, I use cluster robust standard errors,
which, given the small number of clusters, will bias the tests towards rejection.48 This
must be taken into account in those few cases where I find borderline significant estimates.
Third, difference in differences is in truth functional form dependent (Lechner, 2011). The
functional form assumed for the trend should be consistent with the data (Mora & Reggio,
2012). In my analysis I use two cohorts, so I control for a linear trend. Given the short
time window I consider, a linear trend should still give a good approximation to how
48While I can use the WCB (Wild Cluster Bootstrap), employing cluster-robust standard errors allows me
to display graphically the CI, not available when using the WCB.
89
outcomes evolve. The placebo tests also control for a linear trend, so they provide an
indirect test of whether a linear trend is enough to capture the dynamics of the outcomes
common to both sets of municipalities.
Figures C.2 to C.4 shows that the differences in foreign background, parental income
and education - in general favoring students in late grading municipalities - are stable
over time. The same holds for course choices (Figures C.5 and C.6), individual grades
in school year 9 (Figures C.7 to C.9), compulsory school and high school GPA (Figures
C.10 and C.11). These directly relate to the short-run outcomes in my analysis. While
high school enrollment is not recorded in the administrative data, it is interesting to
see that high school GPA differences are stable over time. This is consistent with the
academic quality of the pool enrolling and completing high school being stable over time.
In Figure C.12 I consider the subsample of men (roughly half of the sample, for each
cohort) who went through the military conscription exam, and took cognitive ability tests
at age 19. The picture shows that students living in early grading municipalities have
slightly less cognitive ability, but this difference is stable over time. In Figures C.13 to
C.15 I look at attained education at ages 28-30. Again, I cannot detect differential trends
in 5-year windows. Notice that short high school corresponds up to the early 90s to
vocational high school.49 The fraction of students who completes vocational education is,
as expected, higher in grading municipalities, but the diff-in-diff coefficients in the tests
are all close to 0, implying that differences remain stable over time. This is one of the key
education variables I will be using as an outcome in my analysis, hence it is particularly
reassuring to see that the test passes. A similar picture emerges for long high school
and college attainment.50 Finally income, labor force participation and unemployment
measures (Figures C.16 to C.18) do not change differentially over time in 5 year windows.
The same holds true for measures of upward income and educational mobility (Figures
C.17 and C.20 ).
An important consideration is that restricting the analysis to 5-year windows appears
to be important for the validity of the identification strategy. This seems to be the case
in particular when considering long-run outcomes. There might indeed be an underlying
differential trend in the two sets of municipalities, if one considers cohorts living far apart
in time. This might explain the difference with respect to Sjögren (2010), whose placebo
tests for long-run outcomes fail when running the analysis on 20 cohorts of students.
49A reform in the 90s increased the length of vocational training to three years.
50Notice that year-to-year changes in the levels of the variables reflect changes made by Statistics Swe-
den in the classification of education. Difference-in-difference estimates close to those points should be
disregarded, as the changes might lead to spurious rejections of the null in the tests.
90
20
25
30
35
40
197
5
197
6
197
7
197
8
197
9
198
0
198
1
198
2
198
3
198
4
198
5
198
6
198
7
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
1
199
2
Graded Ungraded
Trends in: Vote share of pro-grades parties (%)
Figure C.1: Test for parallel trends in treatment assignment
Note: The Figure plots aggregate vote share of right-wing parties (in
general favoring early grade assignment) in municipal elections, held every
4 years in Sweden, for grading and non-grading municipalities in the
sample. Dashed vertical lines mark the period in which the two cohorts
in the sample were in school year 6.
Table C.1: Test for parallel trends in pro-grade vote share
Vote share of pro-grades parties (%)
Graded x Year –0.05
(0.08)
Graded 111.89
(160.44)
Year –24.62
(25.11)
Mean 35.23
R2 0.32
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.2: Test for parallel trends in parental background:
Percentage born in Sweden to Swedish parents
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.3: Test for parallel trends in parental background:
Family income (child age 10-16)
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.4: Test for parallel trends in parental background:
Highest parental education (in years)
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.5: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
Percentage choosing advanced math in school year 9
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.6: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
Percentage choosing advanced English in school year 9
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.7: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
Swedish grade in school year 9
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.8: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
Math grade in school year 9
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.9: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
English grade in school year 9
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.10: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
School year 9 GPA
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.11: Test for parallel trends in short-run education outcomes:
High school GPA
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.12: Test for parallel trends in cognitive ability:
Conscription exam ability test (men)
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.13: Test for parallel trends in educational attainment:
Percentage attaining 2-year high-school
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.14: Test for parallel trends in educational attainment:
Percentage attaining 3-year high school
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.15: Test for parallel trends in educational attainment:
Percentage attaining college (>2 years)
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.16: Test for parallel trends in early labor market outcomes:
Gross income at ages 28-32
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.17: Test for parallel trends in intergenerational outcomes:
Percentage of time in the labor force
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.18: Test for parallel trends in intergenerational outcomes:
Percentage of time unemployed
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.19: Test for parallel trends in intergenerational outcomes:
Percentage who is upward mobile in income
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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Figure C.20: Test for parallel trends in intergenerational outcomes:
Percentage who is upward mobile in education
Note: The Figure considers cohorts who studied after early grades were abolished. The upper
panel plots trends for grading and non-grading municipalities in my sample. The lower panel
presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are
run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, controlling for a linear trend.
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C.2 Tests for Differential Response and Compositional Change
Intelligence and SES data is missing for 18% of my sample, but attrition does not change
over time between grading and non-grading municipalities (see Table C.3). It is thus
possible to explore heterogeneous effects by ability and SES. There appear to be no issues
for the surveys taken in grades 6 and 10, but parental surveys display differential attrition
(see Table C.2). Thus I can not use variables from these surveys in the final specification.
Finally, among the standardized tests that end-of-the-year grades are based upon, only the
Swedish test does not exhibit differential attrition. So this will be the only standardized
test I will be using as an outcome.
In Tables C.3 to C.8 I test for differential compositional change in the two sets of
municipalities for a large set of pre-treatment variables. As I run the tests for many
outcomes and for both the whole sample and the individual ability-SES cells I am likely
to find spurious rejections. I thus comment on how the tests perform on average.51 All
demographic and school-level variables pass the tests (see Tables C.4 and C.5). The
placebo tests for relative verbal and inductive ability fail in some cases within cell, but
are by definition 0 in the sample since I normalized ability at the treatment cohort level.52
The cross-sectional differences in marriage and divorce rates found for parents seem to
persist over time (Tables C.6 and C.7). Both income (Table C.5) and a broad measure of
parental education (SES, in Table C.3) pass the tests. Finally most of the occupational
categories (Table C.8) pass the tests for compositional change, confirming that the cross
sectional differences in occupation remained constant over time. When looking at parental
educational attainment, it appears that the fraction of students with college educated
mothers (Table C.6) and fathers (Table C.7) increases less in early grading municipalities
with respect to the late grading municipalities. These differences are consistent with the
two tests that fail for compositional change in occupation: the share of parents involved
in non-manual occupations increased less over time in early grading municipalities.
51In some cases the tests pass in the sample, but not within ability-SES cell. This could be due to compo-
sitional change that I find in the ability measures used for the cell. In my analysis I thus always control
for ability.
52See the discussion in Appendix B.1.
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Table C.2: Tests for differential response:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Student survey -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(school year 6) (0.73) (0.50) (0.16) (0.83) (0.56)
[0.90] [0.99] [0.99] [0.99] [0.99]
Student survey 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.05** 0.03
(school year 10) (0.26) (0.37) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19)
[0.76] [0.69] [0.77] [0.83] [0.88]
Parent survey -0.06 -0.01 -0.06** -0.01 -0.05***
(0.15) (0.67) (0.05) (0.81) (0.01)
[0.74] [0.71] [0.78] [0.82] [0.87]
English Test 0.13* 0.10 0.09 0.17* 0.14
(school year 8) (0.08) (0.20) (0.31) (0.09) (0.13)
[0.24] [0.27] [0.21] [0.20] [0.18]
Swedish Test 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.07
(school year 9) (0.45) (0.34) (0.56) (0.34) (0.52)
[0.33] [0.34] [0.32] [0.30] [0.30]
Math Test -0.26** -0.29*** -0.26** -0.28*** -0.31***
(school year 9) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
[0.27] [0.30] [0.25] [0.23] [0.22]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table C.3: Tests for compositional
change: SES and ability.
Summary of diff-in-diff estimates
All Sample
No SES or ability data 0.03
(0.64)
[0.18]
High-SES 0.00
(0.84)
[0.44]
Low-ability Low-SES -0.00
(0.87)
[0.38]
Low-ability High-SES -0.04*
(0.07)
[0.21]
High-ability Low-SES 0.01
(0.55)
[0.17]
High-ability High-SES 0.03**
(0.04)
[0.23]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in paren-
theses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table C.4: Tests for compositional change: Demographics.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Female -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.52) (0.50) (0.19) (0.71) (0.42)
[0.49] [0.47] [0.48] [0.52] [0.50]
Birth year 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02**
(0.53) (0.36) (0.74) (0.19) (0.03)
[1,969.39] [1,969.20] [1,969.65] [1,969.18] [1,969.63]
Verbal ability 0.01 0.02 -0.09* -0.10 -0.06
(0.85) (0.54) (0.07) (0.13) (0.32)
[-0.00] [-0.53] [-0.33] [0.60] [0.77]
Inductive ability 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.12***
(0.86) (0.95) (0.60) (0.23) (0.00)
[0.00] [-0.53] [-0.41] [0.70] [0.75]
Spatial ability 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
(0.91) (0.47) (0.13) (0.10) (0.25)
[0.00] [-0.33] [-0.15] [0.34] [0.45]
Special Education -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.68) (0.72) (0.44) (0.30) (0.36)
[0.16] [0.25] [0.21] [0.03] [0.03]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table C.5: Tests for compositional change: School and SES.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Switched Class -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.98) (0.75) (0.41) (0.78) (1.00)
[0.12] [0.09] [0.14] [0.07] [0.12]
Changes of teacher 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.09
(0.80) (0.75) (0.37) (0.81) (0.54)
[0.55] [0.59] [0.53] [0.52] [0.46]
Hours absent (s.y. 6) -0.79 -2.65 2.26 -0.16 2.13
(0.86) (0.55) (0.59) (1.00) (0.65)
[26.19] [26.16] [26.40] [24.15] [25.98]
Class size 0.44 0.16 1.08 0.24 0.60
(0.50) (0.89) (0.31) (0.71) (0.40)
[21.39] [21.14] [21.54] [21.62] [21.58]
Parents not Nordic 0.00 -0.02** 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.86) (0.03) (0.11) (0.90) (0.44)
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Quiet home envir. -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.75) (0.46) (0.87) (0.35) (0.27)
[0.95] [0.93] [0.95] [0.96] [0.96]
Family income 0.42 0.30 0.26 0.30 -0.02
(0.36) (0.46) (0.66) (0.68) (0.98)
[272.37] [245.29] [297.31] [248.11] [316.44]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. Family income
measured when the child is 11-16.
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Table C.6: Tests for compositional change: Mother.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Not Nordic 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.43) (0.21) (0.49) (0.87) (0.11)
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04]
Married -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.04
(0.52) (0.54) (0.27) (0.95) (0.20)
[0.74] [0.72] [0.75] [0.74] [0.79]
Divorced -0.01 -0.02 -0.04* -0.03** 0.01
(0.44) (0.40) (0.07) (0.04) (0.78)
[0.18] [0.17] [0.19] [0.15] [0.17]
Compulsory or less -0.03 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.02 -0.07***
(0.14) (0.76) (0.00) (0.62) (0.00)
[0.35] [0.53] [0.16] [0.48] [0.11]
High school -0.01 -0.02 0.04* -0.02 0.04
(0.82) (0.64) (0.10) (0.61) (0.42)
[0.44] [0.47] [0.43] [0.52] [0.36]
College or more 0.04* 0.03** 0.03 0.03* 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.69)
[0.21] [0.00] [0.41] [0.00] [0.53]
In the labor force -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03
(0.89) (0.91) (0.19) (0.65) (0.34)
[0.89] [0.86] [0.93] [0.88] [0.95]
Unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.47) (0.26) (0.37) (0.99) (0.81)
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table C.7: Tests for Compositional Change: Father.
Summary of difference in difference estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Not Nordic 0.01 -0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.01
(0.53) (0.32) (0.10) (0.69) (0.37)
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Married 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.78) (0.98) (0.88) (0.53) (0.30)
[0.77] [0.75] [0.78] [0.79] [0.82]
Divorced -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.57) (0.74) (0.16) (0.91) (0.85)
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.14] [0.15]
Compulsory or less -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.05**
(0.32) (0.64) (0.78) (0.39) (0.03)
[0.41] [0.67] [0.13] [0.63] [0.09]
High school -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06* 0.02
(0.20) (0.50) (0.67) (0.09) (0.57)
[0.40] [0.33] [0.51] [0.37] [0.44]
College or more 0.04*** 0.03** -0.00 0.03** 0.03
(0.00) (0.04) (0.87) (0.04) (0.22)
[0.19] [0.00] [0.36] [0.00] [0.47]
In the labor force -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02*
(0.24) (0.70) (0.33) (0.32) (0.06)
[0.88] [0.85] [0.91] [0.88] [0.93]
Unemployed 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.04**
(0.60) (0.91) (0.32) (0.19) (0.01)
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table C.8: Tests for Compositional Change:
Best of parent occupation.
Summary of difference in difference estimates
Diff-in-Diff
(p-value)
Parents: non-skilled workers, goods -0.01
(0.69)
Parents: non-skilled workers, service 0.01
(0.46)
Parents: skilled workers, goods -0.06***
(0.00)
Parents: skilled workers, service 0.01
(0.17)
Parents: lower non-manual ii 0.00
(0.96)
Parents: lower non-manual i 0.03***
(0.00)
Parents: intermediate-level non-manual 0.02
(0.45)
Parents: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.02
(0.21)
Parents: independent professionals -0.00*
(0.09)
Parents: entrepreneur -0.01
(0.42)
Parents: farmer -0.00
(0.60)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Occupation vari-
ables are taken from Census 1980.
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